Andrew Howat
Biographic Data
| ID | 5414780 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andrew Howat |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andrew |
| FAMILY NAME | Howat |
| SIGNATURE | HOWAT A |
| AFFILIATIONS | California State University, Fullerton |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8736-0855 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
From truth to post-truth
This paper examines two competing strategies for connecting the concept of truth with the phenomenon commonly described as “post-truth.” The first, which I call the Disagreement Approach, draws on Huw Price's argument that truth functions as a substantive epistemic norm governing disagreement. The second, which I develop and defend, is a Value-theoretic Approach. I argue that the Disagreement Approach struggles to account for a phenomenon I call …
Constituting assertion
Misak's Peirce and Pragmatism's Metaphysical Commitments
In this comment on Misak's Cambridge Pragmatism, I examine a case study—debate about the existence of free will—in order to explore residual tensions between Misak's 'truth-affirming,' Peircean pragmatism, and mainstream analytic philosophy. I suggest that Misak's Peirce makes a metaphysical commitment to the existence of rational self-control, and thereby to the existence of free will. I also suggest, however, that her 'analytic pragmatism' thus…
Pragmatism, Truth and Response-Dependence
Pragmatism, Truth and Response-Dependence
Constituting assertion
Misak's Peirce and Pragmatism's Metaphysical Commitments
In this comment on Misak's Cambridge Pragmatism, I examine a case study—debate about the existence of free will—in order to explore residual tensions between Misak's 'truth-affirming,' Peircean pragmatism, and mainstream analytic philosophy. I suggest that Misak's Peirce makes a metaphysical commitment to the existence of rational self-control, and thereby to the existence of free will. I also suggest, however, that her 'analytic pragmatism' thus…
From truth to post-truth
This paper examines two competing strategies for connecting the concept of truth with the phenomenon commonly described as “post-truth.” The first, which I call the Disagreement Approach, draws on Huw Price's argument that truth functions as a substantive epistemic norm governing disagreement. The second, which I develop and defend, is a Value-theoretic Approach. I argue that the Disagreement Approach struggles to account for a phenomenon I call …
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Pragmatism (3 works) · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education (3 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · African cultural and philosophical studies (1 work) · Analytic philosophy (1 work) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 work) · Assertion (1 work)