Misak's Peirce and Pragmatism's Metaphysical Commitments
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8903003 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrew Howat (0000-0002-8736-0855, corresponding author), Andrew Howat Andrew Howat |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 378-378 |
| Publication date | 2018-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Transactions of the Charles S Peirce Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0009-1774 • E-ISSN: 1558-9587 |
| Publisher | Indiana University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.54.3.06 |
| OpenAlex | W2908460087 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 5 |
In this comment on Misak's Cambridge Pragmatism, I examine a case study—debate about the existence of free will—in order to explore residual tensions between Misak's 'truth-affirming,' Peircean pragmatism, and mainstream analytic philosophy. I suggest that Misak's Peirce makes a metaphysical commitment to the existence of rational self-control, and thereby to the existence of free will. I also suggest, however, that her 'analytic pragmatism' thus far offers few clues about how we should defend such a commitment from skeptical arguments emerging from contemporary analytic metaphysics. I conclude that analytic pragmatists have more work to do in explaining pragmatism's complex relationship with metaphysics, and defending its core commitments from skeptical threats
Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Economics · Epistemology · Mainstream · Metaphysics · Order (exchange · Pragmatism · Skepticism · Theology · African cultural and philosophical studies · Philosophy · Political theory and Gramsci · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education
| Highly cited | No |
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