Manish Oza
Biographic Data
| ID | 5541404 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Manish Oza |
| GIVEN NAMES | Manish |
| FAMILY NAME | Oza |
| SIGNATURE | OZA M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Western University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1807-5233 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Can We Legally Revise the Highest Legal Rule
This paper is about whether we can revise the highest rule in a legal system using legal reasoning. HLA Hart and Alf Ross argued that we can’t: either the highest rule is unchangeable, or it can only be changed in a revolution—a merely causal change, not a legal one. I argue, drawing on an idea from Hartry Field about logic and epistemology, that we can. The emergence of the conclusion, within a legal system, that the highest rule should be repla…
Agency and theoretical reason in The Practical Self
My comments focus on the relation between theoretical reason and agency in Gomes’ account. I argue that, while Gomes is right that agency plays a role in relating us to an objective world, accounting for it does not require us to exclude theoretical reason in advance by requiring that the propositions to which we practically assent be theoretically undecidable. There are both theoretical and practical grounds for taking ourselves to have agency i…
Nonsense
Many philosophers suppose that sometimes we think we are saying or thinking something meaningful when we're not saying or thinking anything at all: we are producing nonsense. But what is nonsense? An account of nonsense must, I argue, meet two constraints. The first constraint requires that nonsense can be rationally engaged with, not just mentioned. In particular, we can reason with nonsense and use it within that-clauses. An account which fails…
Freedom Under the Private Law Allan Beever
An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button
The Personality of Public Authorities
Hegel and Formal Idealism
I offer a new reconstruction of Hegel's criticism of Kant's idealism. Kant held that we impose categorial form on experience, while sensation provides its matter. Hegel argues that the matter we receive cannot guide our imposition of form on it. Contra recent interpretations, Hegel's argument does not depend on a conceptualist account of perception or a view of the categories as empirically conditioned. His objection is that, given Kant's dualist…
Fictions in Legal Reasoning
A legal fiction is a knowingly false assumption that is given effect in a legal proceeding and that participants are not permitted to disprove. I offer a semantic pretence theory that shows how fiction-involving legal reasoning works
Irit Samet, Equity
Strategies to Reduce Nonurgent Emergency Department Use
BACKGROUND: This administrative claims analysis evaluated the impact of a health plan-sponsored Emergency Room Utilization Management Initiative (ERUMI), which combined increased patient copays for ED visits with educational outreach to reduce inappropriate ED use and encourage use of retail health clinics (RHCs) and other alternative treatment sites among a commercially insured population. METHODS: Emergency department (ED) utilization rates for…
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Strategies to Reduce Nonurgent Emergency Department Use
BACKGROUND: This administrative claims analysis evaluated the impact of a health plan-sponsored Emergency Room Utilization Management Initiative (ERUMI), which combined increased patient copays for ED visits with educational outreach to reduce inappropriate ED use and encourage use of retail health clinics (RHCs) and other alternative treatment sites among a commercially insured population. METHODS: Emergency department (ED) utilization rates for…
Irit Samet, Equity
Fictions in Legal Reasoning
A legal fiction is a knowingly false assumption that is given effect in a legal proceeding and that participants are not permitted to disprove. I offer a semantic pretence theory that shows how fiction-involving legal reasoning works
Freedom Under the Private Law Allan Beever
An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button
The Personality of Public Authorities
Hegel and Formal Idealism
I offer a new reconstruction of Hegel's criticism of Kant's idealism. Kant held that we impose categorial form on experience, while sensation provides its matter. Hegel argues that the matter we receive cannot guide our imposition of form on it. Contra recent interpretations, Hegel's argument does not depend on a conceptualist account of perception or a view of the categories as empirically conditioned. His objection is that, given Kant's dualist…
Can We Legally Revise the Highest Legal Rule
This paper is about whether we can revise the highest rule in a legal system using legal reasoning. HLA Hart and Alf Ross argued that we can’t: either the highest rule is unchangeable, or it can only be changed in a revolution—a merely causal change, not a legal one. I argue, drawing on an idea from Hartry Field about logic and epistemology, that we can. The emergence of the conclusion, within a legal system, that the highest rule should be repla…
Agency and theoretical reason in The Practical Self
My comments focus on the relation between theoretical reason and agency in Gomes’ account. I argue that, while Gomes is right that agency plays a role in relating us to an objective world, accounting for it does not require us to exclude theoretical reason in advance by requiring that the propositions to which we practically assent be theoretically undecidable. There are both theoretical and practical grounds for taking ourselves to have agency i…
Nonsense
Many philosophers suppose that sometimes we think we are saying or thinking something meaningful when we're not saying or thinking anything at all: we are producing nonsense. But what is nonsense? An account of nonsense must, I argue, meet two constraints. The first constraint requires that nonsense can be rationally engaged with, not just mentioned. In particular, we can reason with nonsense and use it within that-clauses. An account which fails…
Philosophy (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Legal principles and applications (3 works) · Chemistry (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works)