Agency and theoretical reason in The Practical Self
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21335530 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Manish Oza (0000-0002-1807-5233, Western University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Issue | 7 |
| Pages | 2475-2496 |
| Publication date | 2025-08-09 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2024.2438243 |
| OpenAlex | W4405128209 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 16 |
My comments focus on the relation between theoretical reason and agency in Gomes’ account. I argue that, while Gomes is right that agency plays a role in relating us to an objective world, accounting for it does not require us to exclude theoretical reason in advance by requiring that the propositions to which we practically assent be theoretically undecidable. There are both theoretical and practical grounds for taking ourselves to have agency in thinking, and we should prefer an account of reason which allows both kinds of grounds to play a role in rationalizing our commitments. Gomes should, therefore, weaken the dualism of theoretical and practical reason which he takes over from Kant. This dualism is in any event hard to sustain outside the context of transcendental idealism; weakening it allows for what I suggest is a better account of the interaction between theoretical and practical reason
Agency (philosophy) · Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Medicine · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
|---|