A Segal
Biographic Data
| ID | 56246 |
|---|---|
| NAME | A Segal |
| GIVEN NAMES | A |
| FAMILY NAME | Segal |
| SIGNATURE | SEGAL A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Hebrew University of Jerusalem |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2303-3783 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1976 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The Fawn That Never Was
What follows is a dialogue about “Rowe’s fawn”–a case of suffering that is supposed to be one of the thorniest difficulties for a theist. The thorniness derives from the fact that the fawn and its suffering are unknown to us. This precludes any justification of God’s permitting her suffering that appeals to its impact on us. The theistic character, Nahum, provides a novel, powerful and simple reply: there have been no suffering fawns who were unk…
Materialism and Mental Manyism
The Mental Problem of the Many suggests that Materialism implies Mental Manyism: if human beings are material objects, then there are millions of conscious human subjects wherever we thought there was just one. Previous discussions of this problem focus on Mental Manyism, and whether it is substantially harder to live with than ordinary Manyism (about clouds, chairs, trees, etc.). But even if it is, that’ll count against materialism only if none …
Monism and Monotheism
Despite the affinity of monism and monotheism—and despite monism’s recent philosophical renaissance—few have defended the conjunction of the two claims, of what we might call ‘theistic monism’. I argue, first, that monism and monotheism are consistent, and second, that each one provides good reasons to accept the other one. Monotheists, qua monotheists, have good reason to be monists; and monists, qua monists, have good reason to be monotheists. …
Do We Look Material? Human Ontology and Perceptual Evidence
According to certain views about human ontology, the way we seem is very different from the way we are. The appearances are a threat to such views. Here I take up and defuse the threat to one such view. Pure immaterialism says that each of us is wholly immaterial. The appearances suggest otherwise. I argue that despite the fact that we might sometimes appear to be at least partly material, and that we can be perceptually justified in believing so…
Humeanisms: Metaphysical and epistemological
Lost at Sea: A New Route to Metaphysical Skepticism
Global metaphysical skepticism is the view that we have no knowledge of any substantive metaphysical thesis. Various reasons have been provided in support of global metaphysical skepticism. I provide a new one. The reason, very roughly, is this. Metaphysical theses come together as packages. Such packages are very different from each other. Because the packages are so different, we cannot know of any one of the packages that it isn't true. And be…
A Puzzle About Points
Future Options for Jerusalem
This study examines the future of Jerusalem in the context of perceived facts and the availability of the alternatives and political options. It is suggested that the status quo may be prolonged and that formal discussions and negotiations may never take place
Appropriate Technology: The African Experience
This paper defines appropriate technology (AT) in the traditional fashion, describes the vast international AT network, summarizes the AT projects launched in Botswana and Ghana, discusses several other appropriate technologies and AT organizations in Africa, and suggests AT as the best, in some cases perhaps the only, technological alternative for Africa that could satisfy the dual requirements of efficiency and equity
Population Policies in the Caribbean
Appropriate Technology: The African Experience
This paper defines appropriate technology (AT) in the traditional fashion, describes the vast international AT network, summarizes the AT projects launched in Botswana and Ghana, discusses several other appropriate technologies and AT organizations in Africa, and suggests AT as the best, in some cases perhaps the only, technological alternative for Africa that could satisfy the dual requirements of efficiency and equity
Population Policies in the Caribbean
Appropriate Technology: The African Experience
This paper defines appropriate technology (AT) in the traditional fashion, describes the vast international AT network, summarizes the AT projects launched in Botswana and Ghana, discusses several other appropriate technologies and AT organizations in Africa, and suggests AT as the best, in some cases perhaps the only, technological alternative for Africa that could satisfy the dual requirements of efficiency and equity
Future Options for Jerusalem
This study examines the future of Jerusalem in the context of perceived facts and the availability of the alternatives and political options. It is suggested that the status quo may be prolonged and that formal discussions and negotiations may never take place
A Puzzle About Points
Lost at Sea: A New Route to Metaphysical Skepticism
Global metaphysical skepticism is the view that we have no knowledge of any substantive metaphysical thesis. Various reasons have been provided in support of global metaphysical skepticism. I provide a new one. The reason, very roughly, is this. Metaphysical theses come together as packages. Such packages are very different from each other. Because the packages are so different, we cannot know of any one of the packages that it isn't true. And be…
Humeanisms: Metaphysical and epistemological
Do We Look Material? Human Ontology and Perceptual Evidence
According to certain views about human ontology, the way we seem is very different from the way we are. The appearances are a threat to such views. Here I take up and defuse the threat to one such view. Pure immaterialism says that each of us is wholly immaterial. The appearances suggest otherwise. I argue that despite the fact that we might sometimes appear to be at least partly material, and that we can be perceptually justified in believing so…
Monism and Monotheism
Despite the affinity of monism and monotheism—and despite monism’s recent philosophical renaissance—few have defended the conjunction of the two claims, of what we might call ‘theistic monism’. I argue, first, that monism and monotheism are consistent, and second, that each one provides good reasons to accept the other one. Monotheists, qua monotheists, have good reason to be monists; and monists, qua monists, have good reason to be monotheists. …
Materialism and Mental Manyism
The Mental Problem of the Many suggests that Materialism implies Mental Manyism: if human beings are material objects, then there are millions of conscious human subjects wherever we thought there was just one. Previous discussions of this problem focus on Mental Manyism, and whether it is substantially harder to live with than ordinary Manyism (about clouds, chairs, trees, etc.). But even if it is, that’ll count against materialism only if none …
The Fawn That Never Was
What follows is a dialogue about “Rowe’s fawn”–a case of suffering that is supposed to be one of the thorniest difficulties for a theist. The thorniness derives from the fact that the fawn and its suffering are unknown to us. This precludes any justification of God’s permitting her suffering that appeals to its impact on us. The theistic character, Nahum, provides a novel, powerful and simple reply: there have been no suffering fawns who were unk…
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Development economics (2 works)