Do We Look Material? Human Ontology and Perceptual Evidence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21408970 |
|---|---|
| Authors | A Segal (0000-0002-2303-3783, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 172-186 |
| Publication date | 2023-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Canadian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0045-5091 • E-ISSN: 1911-0820 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/can.2023.38 |
| OpenAlex | W4389676087 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 20 |
According to certain views about human ontology, the way we seem is very different from the way we are. The appearances are a threat to such views. Here I take up and defuse the threat to one such view. Pure immaterialism says that each of us is wholly immaterial. The appearances suggest otherwise. I argue that despite the fact that we might sometimes appear to be at least partly material, and that we can be perceptually justified in believing something solely on the basis of having a perceptual experience as of its being the case, none of us is ever perceptually justified in believing that we are even partly material (or that we’re not). Bottom line: we might be able to know whether we’re material, but we can’t know just by looking
Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Ontology · Perception · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |