Jeroen van de Ven
Biographic Data
| ID | 5650860 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jeroen van de Ven |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jeroen |
| FAMILY NAME | van de Ven |
| SIGNATURE | VAN DE VEN J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Tinbergen Institute |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5111-0427 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Cognitive Biases: Mistakes or Missing Stakes
Despite decades of research on heuristics and biases, evidence on the effect of large incentives on cognitive biases is scant. We test the effect of incentives on four widely documented biases: base-rate neglect, anchoring, failure of contingent thinking, and intuitive reasoning. In laboratory experiments with 1,236 college students in Nairobi, we implement three incentive levels: no incentives, standard lab payments, and very high incentives. We…
Fight or Flight: Endogenous Timing in Conflicts
We study a dynamic game in which players compete for a prize. In a waiting game with two-sided private information about strength levels, players choose fighting, fleeing, or waiting. Players earn a “deterrence value” on top of the prize if their opponent escapes without a battle. We show that this value is a key determinant of the type of equilibrium. For intermediate values, sorting takes place, with weaker players fleeing before others fight. …
Doing Bad to Look Good: Negative Consequences of Image Concerns on Prosocial Behavior
Plusieurs études montrent que les préoccupations d’image sociale stimulent les comportements prosociaux. Nous étudions un contexte dans lequel il existe une incertitude sur l’action qui est prosociale. La quête d’une meilleure image sociale entre alors potentiellement en conflit avec le comportement prosocial. Ce conflit peut induire un « mauvais » comportement, où les individus réduisent leurs gains monétaires et ceux des autres afin de préserve…
Bad News: An Experimental Study on the Informational Effects Of Rewards
Psychologists and economists have argued that rewards often have hidden costs. One possible reason is that the principal may have incentives to offer higher rewards when she knows the task is difficult. Our experiment tests if high rewards embody such bad news and if this is correctly perceived by their recipients. Our design allows us to decompose the overall effect of rewards on effort into a direct incentive and an informational effect. The re…
Framing Contracts
»Vielmehr bietet [der Kommentar] auf höchstem Niveau eine substantielle Auseinandersetzung mit den Hintergründen, den Zusammenhängen, der Theorie und der Praxis des Grundgesetzes. Besseres lässt sich von einem Verfassungskommentar nicht sagen.“ Herbert Günther Staaatsanzeiger für das Land Hessen 2018 (50), 1494–1495
Can Observers Predict Trustworthiness
We investigate whether experimental subjects can predict behavior in a prisoner's dilemma played on a TV show. Subjects report probabilistic beliefs that a player cooperates, before and after the players communicate. Subjects correctly predict that women and players who make a voluntary promise are more likely to cooperate. They are able to distinguish truth from lies when a player is asked about her intentions by the host. Subjects are to some e…
Friendships and Favouritism on the Schoolground – A Framed Field Experiment
We present experimental evidence on favouritism practices. Children compete in teams in a tournament. After the first round of a real effort task, children indicate which group member they would prefer to do the task in the second round, for the benefit of the team. Friends are much more likely to be chosen than others after controlling for performance. We also find that children who are favoured by their friend subsequently increase performance.…
The Demand for Social Approval and Status as a Motivation to Give
The aim of this paper is to explain gift giving as due to a demand for social approval and status. In a simple framework we are able to account for a number of stylized facts. These are that gift giving is often reciprocal, that gifts tend to be inadequate, and that gift giving is sometimes reduced after a monetary compensation is offered. The implication for the interaction between gift giving and the market institution is that implementing pric…
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The Demand for Social Approval and Status as a Motivation to Give
The aim of this paper is to explain gift giving as due to a demand for social approval and status. In a simple framework we are able to account for a number of stylized facts. These are that gift giving is often reciprocal, that gifts tend to be inadequate, and that gift giving is sometimes reduced after a monetary compensation is offered. The implication for the interaction between gift giving and the market institution is that implementing pric…
Friendships and Favouritism on the Schoolground – A Framed Field Experiment
We present experimental evidence on favouritism practices. Children compete in teams in a tournament. After the first round of a real effort task, children indicate which group member they would prefer to do the task in the second round, for the benefit of the team. Friends are much more likely to be chosen than others after controlling for performance. We also find that children who are favoured by their friend subsequently increase performance.…
Framing Contracts
»Vielmehr bietet [der Kommentar] auf höchstem Niveau eine substantielle Auseinandersetzung mit den Hintergründen, den Zusammenhängen, der Theorie und der Praxis des Grundgesetzes. Besseres lässt sich von einem Verfassungskommentar nicht sagen.“ Herbert Günther Staaatsanzeiger für das Land Hessen 2018 (50), 1494–1495
Can Observers Predict Trustworthiness
We investigate whether experimental subjects can predict behavior in a prisoner's dilemma played on a TV show. Subjects report probabilistic beliefs that a player cooperates, before and after the players communicate. Subjects correctly predict that women and players who make a voluntary promise are more likely to cooperate. They are able to distinguish truth from lies when a player is asked about her intentions by the host. Subjects are to some e…
Bad News: An Experimental Study on the Informational Effects Of Rewards
Psychologists and economists have argued that rewards often have hidden costs. One possible reason is that the principal may have incentives to offer higher rewards when she knows the task is difficult. Our experiment tests if high rewards embody such bad news and if this is correctly perceived by their recipients. Our design allows us to decompose the overall effect of rewards on effort into a direct incentive and an informational effect. The re…
Doing Bad to Look Good: Negative Consequences of Image Concerns on Prosocial Behavior
Plusieurs études montrent que les préoccupations d’image sociale stimulent les comportements prosociaux. Nous étudions un contexte dans lequel il existe une incertitude sur l’action qui est prosociale. La quête d’une meilleure image sociale entre alors potentiellement en conflit avec le comportement prosocial. Ce conflit peut induire un « mauvais » comportement, où les individus réduisent leurs gains monétaires et ceux des autres afin de préserve…
Fight or Flight: Endogenous Timing in Conflicts
We study a dynamic game in which players compete for a prize. In a waiting game with two-sided private information about strength levels, players choose fighting, fleeing, or waiting. Players earn a “deterrence value” on top of the prize if their opponent escapes without a battle. We show that this value is a key determinant of the type of equilibrium. For intermediate values, sorting takes place, with weaker players fleeing before others fight. …
Cognitive Biases: Mistakes or Missing Stakes
Despite decades of research on heuristics and biases, evidence on the effect of large incentives on cognitive biases is scant. We test the effect of incentives on four widely documented biases: base-rate neglect, anchoring, failure of contingent thinking, and intuitive reasoning. In laboratory experiments with 1,236 college students in Nairobi, we implement three incentive levels: no incentives, standard lab payments, and very high incentives. We…
Economics (7 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (7 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Social Psychology (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (3 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (3 works) · Game Theory and Applications (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Business (2 works)