Marie Isabelle Chevrier
Biographic Data
| ID | 5684462 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Marie Isabelle Chevrier |
| GIVEN NAMES | Marie Isabelle |
| FAMILY NAME | Chevrier |
| SIGNATURE | CHEVRIER M I |
| AFFILIATIONS | a Assistant Professor of Political Economy , University of Texas , Dallas, P.O. Box 830688, Richardson, TX, USA |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1990 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The Aftermath of Aum Shinrikyo
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Impediment to proliferation? Analysing the biological weapons convention
From Verification to Strengthening Compliance
International concern with the ability of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to fulfill its purpose induced the treaty parties to explore the means to promote compliance with the treaty and to detect noncompliance. In September 1995, the Conference on Disarmament hosted a Special Conference to discuss the findings of the ad hoc group of governmental experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific an…
Weapons of War or Ravages of Nature? Investigating the Use of CBW
The article by Peter Barss is a valuable contribution to the existing literature on the investigation of the use of chemical, biological, or toxin weapons (CBW). 1 He constructs detailed procedures to investigate allegations of the use of any of these weapons from the perspective of epidemiology theory. Barss reviews the investigations of the alleged use of toxin weapons (“yellow rain”) in Laos and Cambodia, the use of chemical weapons by both si…
The Biological Weapons Convention
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 bans the development and possession of biological and toxin weapons. Yet the threat that a country may acquire and use biological and toxin weapons (BTW) persists—not all nations are party to the treaty, and doubts remain about the compliance of countries who are. Seventy of the 118 nations who are parties to the treaty met in Geneva from September 9 to 27, 1991, to review the performance …
Verifying the Unverifiable
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is widely regarded as a treaty whose provisions are difficult to verify because of the paucity of measures to verify compliance within the treaty framework and the nature of the weapons themselves. Advances in biotechnology and their effect on the perceived military utility of biological weapons have focused international attention on this issue. This article examines the concepts of “adequate” and “effecti…
From Verification to Strengthening Compliance
International concern with the ability of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to fulfill its purpose induced the treaty parties to explore the means to promote compliance with the treaty and to detect noncompliance. In September 1995, the Conference on Disarmament hosted a Special Conference to discuss the findings of the ad hoc group of governmental experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific an…
The Biological Weapons Convention
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 bans the development and possession of biological and toxin weapons. Yet the threat that a country may acquire and use biological and toxin weapons (BTW) persists—not all nations are party to the treaty, and doubts remain about the compliance of countries who are. Seventy of the 118 nations who are parties to the treaty met in Geneva from September 9 to 27, 1991, to review the performance …
Verifying the Unverifiable
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is widely regarded as a treaty whose provisions are difficult to verify because of the paucity of measures to verify compliance within the treaty framework and the nature of the weapons themselves. Advances in biotechnology and their effect on the perceived military utility of biological weapons have focused international attention on this issue. This article examines the concepts of “adequate” and “effecti…
The Aftermath of Aum Shinrikyo
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Impediment to proliferation? Analysing the biological weapons convention
Verifying the Unverifiable
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is widely regarded as a treaty whose provisions are difficult to verify because of the paucity of measures to verify compliance within the treaty framework and the nature of the weapons themselves. Advances in biotechnology and their effect on the perceived military utility of biological weapons have focused international attention on this issue. This article examines the concepts of “adequate” and “effecti…
Weapons of War or Ravages of Nature? Investigating the Use of CBW
The article by Peter Barss is a valuable contribution to the existing literature on the investigation of the use of chemical, biological, or toxin weapons (CBW). 1 He constructs detailed procedures to investigate allegations of the use of any of these weapons from the perspective of epidemiology theory. Barss reviews the investigations of the alleged use of toxin weapons (“yellow rain”) in Laos and Cambodia, the use of chemical weapons by both si…
The Biological Weapons Convention
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 bans the development and possession of biological and toxin weapons. Yet the threat that a country may acquire and use biological and toxin weapons (BTW) persists—not all nations are party to the treaty, and doubts remain about the compliance of countries who are. Seventy of the 118 nations who are parties to the treaty met in Geneva from September 9 to 27, 1991, to review the performance …
Impediment to proliferation? Analysing the biological weapons convention
From Verification to Strengthening Compliance
International concern with the ability of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to fulfill its purpose induced the treaty parties to explore the means to promote compliance with the treaty and to detect noncompliance. In September 1995, the Conference on Disarmament hosted a Special Conference to discuss the findings of the ad hoc group of governmental experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific an…
The Aftermath of Aum Shinrikyo
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Political science (6 works) · Biological warfare (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Bacillus and Francisella bacterial research (4 works) · Convention (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Compliance (psychology (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works)