Verifying the Unverifiable

Lessons from the Biological Weapons Convention

Bibliographic Data

ID12063357
AuthorsMarie Isabelle Chevrier (corresponding author)
Year1990
Volume9
Issue1
Pages93-105
Publication date1990-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitics and the Life Sciences (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0730-9384 • E-ISSN: 1471-5457
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s073093840001025x
OpenAlexW2586675646
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited11

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is widely regarded as a treaty whose provisions are difficult to verify because of the paucity of measures to verify compliance within the treaty framework and the nature of the weapons themselves. Advances in biotechnology and their effect on the perceived military utility of biological weapons have focused international attention on this issue. This article examines the concepts of “adequate” and “effective” verification and argues that the treaty falls under the definition of adequate verification in the United States. For other countries, however, the lack of verification measures is of greater concern. The article describes measures that should be added to the BWC to detect violations and promote compliance with the treaty. These include improved methods of resolving allegations of noncompliance, increased reporting requirements for activities permitted under the treaty, greater openness in biological research, and inspections of laboratories and other facilities

Biological warfare · Business · Compliance (psychology · Convention · Law and economics · Openness to experience · Political science · Sociology · Treaty · Bacillus and Francisella bacterial research · Biotechnology and Related Fields · Genetically Modified Organisms Research · Law · Psychology

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub