Volker H Franz
Biographic Data
| ID | 5710642 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Volker H Franz |
| GIVEN NAMES | Volker H |
| FAMILY NAME | Franz |
| SIGNATURE | FRANZ V H |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Tübingen |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8457-0611 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Information-Theoretic Measures of Metacognition
Metacognition comprises the ability to differentiate the accuracy of predictions about the world. This is often called Type 2 performance (with Type 1 performance being the overall accuracy). Typical measures of metacognition are based on signal detection theory and require the strong assumption of truncated normal noise underlying confidence ratings. To minimize distributional assumptions, measures based on classical information theory have been…
No evidence for contextual cueing beyond explicit recognition
Many studies claim that visual regularities can be learned unconsciously and without explicit awareness. For example in the contextual cueing paradigm, studies often make claims using a standard reasoning based on two results: (1) a reliable response time (RT) difference between repeated vs. new stimulus displays and (2) a close-to-chance sensitivity when participants are asked to explicitly recognize repeated stimulus displays. From this pattern…
Modal and amodal cognition
Accounting for how the human mind represents the internal and external world is a crucial feature of many theories of human cognition. Central to this question is the distinction between modal as opposed to amodal representational formats. It has often been assumed that one but not both of these two types of representations underlie processing in specific domains of cognition (e.g., perception, mental imagery, and language). However, in this pape…
Neural mechanisms of response priming do not support veridical unconscious processing
Current developments and challenges for the British Journal of Psychology
No prominent works on this page.
Current developments and challenges for the British Journal of Psychology
Neural mechanisms of response priming do not support veridical unconscious processing
No evidence for contextual cueing beyond explicit recognition
Many studies claim that visual regularities can be learned unconsciously and without explicit awareness. For example in the contextual cueing paradigm, studies often make claims using a standard reasoning based on two results: (1) a reliable response time (RT) difference between repeated vs. new stimulus displays and (2) a close-to-chance sensitivity when participants are asked to explicitly recognize repeated stimulus displays. From this pattern…
Modal and amodal cognition
Accounting for how the human mind represents the internal and external world is a crucial feature of many theories of human cognition. Central to this question is the distinction between modal as opposed to amodal representational formats. It has often been assumed that one but not both of these two types of representations underlie processing in specific domains of cognition (e.g., perception, mental imagery, and language). However, in this pape…
Information-Theoretic Measures of Metacognition
Metacognition comprises the ability to differentiate the accuracy of predictions about the world. This is often called Type 2 performance (with Type 1 performance being the overall accuracy). Typical measures of metacognition are based on signal detection theory and require the strong assumption of truncated normal noise underlying confidence ratings. To minimize distributional assumptions, measures based on classical information theory have been…
Psychology (4 works) · Cognitive psychology (3 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies (2 works) · Neuroscience (2 works) · Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning (1 work) · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis (1 work) · Amodal perception (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work)