No evidence for contextual cueing beyond explicit recognition

Bibliographic Data

ID21640672
AuthorsSascha Meyen (0000-0001-6928-4126, University of Tübingen, corresponding author), Miguel A Vadillo (0000-0001-8421-816X, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid), Ulrike von Luxburg (Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience Tübingen), Volker H Franz (0000-0002-8457-0611, University of Tübingen)
Year2024
Volume31
Issue3
Pages907-930
Publication date2024-06-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePsychonomic Bulletin & Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1069-9384 • E-ISSN: 1531-5320
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.3758/s13423-023-02358-3
PMID37845567
OpenAlexW4387674130
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited111

Many studies claim that visual regularities can be learned unconsciously and without explicit awareness. For example in the contextual cueing paradigm, studies often make claims using a standard reasoning based on two results: (1) a reliable response time (RT) difference between repeated vs. new stimulus displays and (2) a close-to-chance sensitivity when participants are asked to explicitly recognize repeated stimulus displays. From this pattern of results, studies routinely conclude that the sensitivity of RT responses is higher than that of explicit responses—an empirical situation we call Indirect Task Advantage (ITA). Many studies further infer from an ITA that RT effects were driven by a form of recognition that exceeds explicit memory: implicit recognition . However, this reasoning is flawed because the sensitivity underlying RT effects is never computed. To properly establish a difference, a sensitivity comparison is required. We apply this sensitivity comparison in a reanalysis of 20 contextual cueing studies showing that not a single study provides consistent evidence for ITAs. Responding to recent correlation-based arguments, we also demonstrate the absence of evidence for ITAs at the level of individual participants. This lack of ITAs has serious consequences for the field: If RT effects can be fully explained by weak but above-chance explicit recognition sensitivity, what is the empirical content of the label “implicit”? Thus, theoretical discussions in this paradigm-and likely in other paradigms using this standard reasoning-require serious reassessment because the current data from contextual cueing studies is insufficient to consider recognition as implicit

Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Communication · Face Recognition and Perception · Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies · Psychology · Visual perception and processing mechanisms

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