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Ali Hossein Khani

Biographic Data

ID5722677
NAMEAli Hossein Khani
GIVEN NAMESAli Hossein
FAMILY NAMEKhani
SIGNATUREKHANI A H
AFFILIATIONSInstitute for Research in Fundamental Sciences
ORCID0000-0002-0537-3805
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS8
TOTAL CITATIONS1
AUTHOR COUNT8
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2019
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX1
  • Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Meaning

    Open Access•Ali Hossein Khani•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2025

  • Naturalism and Its Challenges

    Gary N Kemp, Ali Hossein Khani et al.•BOOK•Naturalism and Its Challenges•2024

  • Intention and Judgment-Dependence

    Ali Hossein Khani•ARTICLE•Philosophical Explorations•2024

    A Third-Person-Based or Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account of mental content implies that, as an a priori matter, facts about a subject’s mental content are precisely captured by the judgments of a second-person or an interpreter. Alex Byrne, Bill Child, and others have discussed attributing such a view to Donald Davidson. This account significantly departs from a First-Person-Based or First-Personal Judgment-Dependent account, such as Cri…

  • Davidson on Pure Intending

    Open Access•Ali Hossein Khani•ARTICLE•Dialogue•2022•References: 65

    I will argue that Davidson's account of pure intending can be construed as a first-person-based judgement-dependent account of intention. For Davidson, pure intending to do φ is to make an all-out judgement that φing is desirable. On this anti-reductionist account, intention is treated as an irreducible state of the subject. I will draw a comparison between this account and Wright's and I will show that Davidson's account can be viewed as a non-r…

  • Davidson on Self‐Knowledge

    Open Access•Ali Hossein Khani•ARTICLE•The Southern Journal of Philosophy•2021

    Davidson has attempted to offer his own solution to the problem of self‐knowledge, but there has been no consensus between his commentators on what this solution is. Many have claimed that Davidson's account stems from his remarks on disquotational specifications of self‐ascriptions of meaning and mental content, the account which I will call the “Disquotational Explanation.” It has also been claimed that Davidson's account rather rests on his ve…

  • Interpretationism and judgement-dependence

    Open Access•Ali Hossein Khani•ARTICLE•Synthese•2021•Cited by: 1•References: 30

  • Relativism

    Open Access•Ali Hossein Khani•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2021

    In this outstanding book, Baghramian and Coliva take us through a variety of prominent issues about the philosophically salient notion of relativism. The book consists of ten chapters, including an introduction to, as well as an informative historical review of, relativism in Chapters 1 and 2, followed by seven chapters covering four general types of relativism: Alethic Relativism, Conceptual Relativism, Epistemic Relativism and Moral Relativism.…

  • Working from Within

    Open Access•Ali Hossein Khani•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2019

    Verhaegh's rich and stimulating book on the evolution of Quine's naturalism in his works consists of eight chapters which together form two general parts: Part one concerns the nature and part two concentrates on the development and reception of Quine's naturalism. After a very informative introduction, Verhaegh, in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively discusses Quine's Naturalizing Epistemology and Naturalizing Metaphysics. Chapter 2 starts by questio…

  • Interpretationism and judgement-dependence

    Open Access•Ali Hossein Khani•ARTICLE•Synthese•2021•Cited by: 1•References: 30

  • Working from Within

    Open Access•Ali Hossein Khani•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2019

    Verhaegh's rich and stimulating book on the evolution of Quine's naturalism in his works consists of eight chapters which together form two general parts: Part one concerns the nature and part two concentrates on the development and reception of Quine's naturalism. After a very informative introduction, Verhaegh, in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively discusses Quine's Naturalizing Epistemology and Naturalizing Metaphysics. Chapter 2 starts by questio…

  • Davidson on Self‐Knowledge

    Open Access•Ali Hossein Khani•ARTICLE•The Southern Journal of Philosophy•2021

    Davidson has attempted to offer his own solution to the problem of self‐knowledge, but there has been no consensus between his commentators on what this solution is. Many have claimed that Davidson's account stems from his remarks on disquotational specifications of self‐ascriptions of meaning and mental content, the account which I will call the “Disquotational Explanation.” It has also been claimed that Davidson's account rather rests on his ve…

  • Interpretationism and judgement-dependence

    Open Access•Ali Hossein Khani•ARTICLE•Synthese•2021•Cited by: 1•References: 30

  • Relativism

    Open Access•Ali Hossein Khani•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2021

    In this outstanding book, Baghramian and Coliva take us through a variety of prominent issues about the philosophically salient notion of relativism. The book consists of ten chapters, including an introduction to, as well as an informative historical review of, relativism in Chapters 1 and 2, followed by seven chapters covering four general types of relativism: Alethic Relativism, Conceptual Relativism, Epistemic Relativism and Moral Relativism.…

  • Davidson on Pure Intending

    Open Access•Ali Hossein Khani•ARTICLE•Dialogue•2022•References: 65

    I will argue that Davidson's account of pure intending can be construed as a first-person-based judgement-dependent account of intention. For Davidson, pure intending to do φ is to make an all-out judgement that φing is desirable. On this anti-reductionist account, intention is treated as an irreducible state of the subject. I will draw a comparison between this account and Wright's and I will show that Davidson's account can be viewed as a non-r…

  • Naturalism and Its Challenges

    Gary N Kemp, Ali Hossein Khani et al.•BOOK•Naturalism and Its Challenges•2024

  • Intention and Judgment-Dependence

    Ali Hossein Khani•ARTICLE•Philosophical Explorations•2024

    A Third-Person-Based or Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account of mental content implies that, as an a priori matter, facts about a subject’s mental content are precisely captured by the judgments of a second-person or an interpreter. Alex Byrne, Bill Child, and others have discussed attributing such a view to Donald Davidson. This account significantly departs from a First-Person-Based or First-Personal Judgment-Dependent account, such as Cri…

  • Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Meaning

    Open Access•Ali Hossein Khani•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2025

Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Meaning (existential) (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Judgement (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works)

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