Kaave Lajevardi
Biographic Data
| ID | 5722954 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kaave Lajevardi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kaave |
| FAMILY NAME | Lajevardi |
| SIGNATURE | LAJEVARDI K |
| AFFILIATIONS | La Société des Philosophes Chômeurs |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3710-237X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
On a Fallacy Concerning I-Am-Unprovable Sentences
We demonstrate that, in itself and in the absence of extra premises, the following argument scheme is fallacious: The sentence A says about itself that it has a certain property F, and A does in fact have the property F; therefore A is true. We then examine an argument of this form in Gödel's introduction to his classic paper on incompleteness and examine some auxiliary premises which might have been at work in that context. Philosophically signi…
Dogmatism Paradox à la Kripke
I aim at dissolving Saul Kripke’s dogmatism paradox by defending the idea that, with respect to any particular proposition p known by a subject A , it is not irrational for A to ignore all evidence against p . Here my defence of the dogmatic attitude depends on the crucial assumption – and this is an assumption made by Kripke himself in the setting of the paradox – that A wishes above all else to avoid gaining a false belief or losing a true one.…
On the Arithmetical Truth of Self‐Referential Sentences
We take an argument of Gödel's from his ground‐breaking 1931 paper, generalize it, and examine its validity. The argument in question is this: the sentence G says about itself that it is not provable, and G is indeed not provable; therefore, G is true
Laws and Counterfactuals
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Laws and Counterfactuals
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
On the Arithmetical Truth of Self‐Referential Sentences
We take an argument of Gödel's from his ground‐breaking 1931 paper, generalize it, and examine its validity. The argument in question is this: the sentence G says about itself that it is not provable, and G is indeed not provable; therefore, G is true
On a Fallacy Concerning I-Am-Unprovable Sentences
We demonstrate that, in itself and in the absence of extra premises, the following argument scheme is fallacious: The sentence A says about itself that it has a certain property F, and A does in fact have the property F; therefore A is true. We then examine an argument of this form in Gödel's introduction to his classic paper on incompleteness and examine some auxiliary premises which might have been at work in that context. Philosophically signi…
Dogmatism Paradox à la Kripke
I aim at dissolving Saul Kripke’s dogmatism paradox by defending the idea that, with respect to any particular proposition p known by a subject A , it is not irrational for A to ignore all evidence against p . Here my defence of the dogmatic attitude depends on the crucial assumption – and this is an assumption made by Kripke himself in the setting of the paradox – that A wishes above all else to avoid gaining a false belief or losing a true one.…
Argument (complex analysis) (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Arithmetic function (1 work) · Counterfactual conditional (1 work) · Counterfactual thinking (1 work) · Criticism (1 work) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (1 work) · Epistemology (1 work)