On the Arithmetical Truth of Self‐Referential Sentences
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143394 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kaave Lajevardi (0000-0003-3710-237X, La Société des Philosophes Chômeurs), Saeed Salehi (0000-0002-2037-8284, University of Tabriz) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 85 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 8-17 |
| Publication date | 2019-02-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12169 |
| OpenAlex | W2787741193 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 7 |
We take an argument of Gödel's from his ground‐breaking 1931 paper, generalize it, and examine its validity. The argument in question is this: the sentence G says about itself that it is not provable, and G is indeed not provable; therefore, G is true
Argument (complex analysis) · Arithmetic function · Sentence · Truth condition · Truth value · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |