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Harold Morick

Biographic Data

ID5722971
NAMEHarold Morick
GIVEN NAMESHarold
FAMILY NAMEMorick
SIGNATUREMORICK H
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS6
TOTAL CITATIONS0
WORKS AS AUTHOR6
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1968
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR1981
H-INDEX0
  • Opacity and Mentality

    Harold Morick•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1981

  • Diskussion/Discussion

    Open Access•Harold Morick•ARTICLE•Analyse & Kritik•1980

    Contrary to Marras: (1) the third of Chisholm’s Intentional criteria of sentences about mental states and events succeeds in highlighting an intuitive feature of Intentionality. (2) If there is such a thing as modality, it resides either in the way we speak of things or in the things, regardless of the way we speak of them. If the latter, modal sentences fail to satisfy Chisholm’s criterion for mentalistic sentences; and if the former, modal sent…

  • Can We Believe What We Know

    Harold Morick•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1980

  • Extensionalizing the Nonpsychological

    Harold Morick•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1976

  • Cartesian Privilege and the Strictly Mental

    Harold Morick•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1971

  • Scepticism and the First Person

    Harold Morick, S Coval•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1968

No prominent works on this page.

  • Scepticism and the First Person

    Harold Morick, S Coval•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1968

  • Cartesian Privilege and the Strictly Mental

    Harold Morick•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1971

  • Extensionalizing the Nonpsychological

    Harold Morick•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1976

  • Diskussion/Discussion

    Open Access•Harold Morick•ARTICLE•Analyse & Kritik•1980

    Contrary to Marras: (1) the third of Chisholm’s Intentional criteria of sentences about mental states and events succeeds in highlighting an intuitive feature of Intentionality. (2) If there is such a thing as modality, it resides either in the way we speak of things or in the things, regardless of the way we speak of them. If the latter, modal sentences fail to satisfy Chisholm’s criterion for mentalistic sentences; and if the former, modal sent…

  • Can We Believe What We Know

    Harold Morick•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1980

  • Opacity and Mentality

    Harold Morick•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1981

Philosophy (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (2 works) · Computer security (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology (1 work)

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