Diskussion/Discussion

Contrary to Marras: (1) the third of Chisholm’s Intentional criteria of sentences about mental states and events succeeds in highlighting an intuitive feature of Intentionality. (2) If there is such a thing as modality, it resides either in the way we speak of things or in the things, regardless of the way we speak of them. If the latter, modal sentences fail to satisfy Chisholm’s criterion for mentalistic sentences; and if the former, modal sentences turn out to be mentalistic sentences. So either way − if either the latter or the former − modal sentences fail to provide a counterexample to Chisholm’s claim that his criterion picks out only mentalistic sentences. (3) Functionalism doesn’t enable physicalism to accomodate Intentional states and events, because functionalism rejects a traditional tenet of physicalism

Counterexample · Epistemology · Functionalism (philosophy of mind · Intentionality · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Modal · Modality (human–computer interaction · Philosophy of mind · Physicalism · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Artificial Intelligence