SERGI ROSELL
Biographic Data
| ID | 5723487 |
|---|---|
| NAME | SERGI ROSELL |
| GIVEN NAMES | SERGI |
| FAMILY NAME | ROSELL |
| SIGNATURE | ROSELL S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Sheffield |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6448-4409 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Exemplars and Individual Responsibility in Agency-Stultifying Situations
The aim of this article is to present the problem of individual responsibility in (what we call) agency-stultifying situations and examine whether exemplarism can be a more promising way of addressing it than prevailing moral theories. Agency-stultifying situations are situations in which the actions of a sufficiently large number of individuals produce a cumulative harm, but where none of these individuals, in isolation, can make a difference in…
A New Moral Paradox
In “Taking Offence” (2010), John Shand presents a challenge to the intuitive view that a wrong act performed intentionally is always morally worse, and then more culpable, than that same act performed unintentionally, so that the opposite can hold in certain circumstances. My aim here is to dissolve any appearance of paradox or counter-intuitiveness of the phenomenon in question by articulating an alternative explanation which rests upon a (plaus…
El argumento contra la suerte moral
En la primera parte del artículo se reconstruye detalladamente el argumento global contra la suerte moral en todos sus tipos, distinguiendo dos estrategias principales (moderada y radical). A continuación se defiende que ninguna de ellas es sostenible, pues si la primera resulta insuficiente, la segunda es impráctica y finalmente incoherente. Fundamentalmente se intenta mostrar que un argumento definitivo contra la suerte moral en todos sus tipos…
No prominent works on this page.
El argumento contra la suerte moral
En la primera parte del artículo se reconstruye detalladamente el argumento global contra la suerte moral en todos sus tipos, distinguiendo dos estrategias principales (moderada y radical). A continuación se defiende que ninguna de ellas es sostenible, pues si la primera resulta insuficiente, la segunda es impráctica y finalmente incoherente. Fundamentalmente se intenta mostrar que un argumento definitivo contra la suerte moral en todos sus tipos…
A New Moral Paradox
In “Taking Offence” (2010), John Shand presents a challenge to the intuitive view that a wrong act performed intentionally is always morally worse, and then more culpable, than that same act performed unintentionally, so that the opposite can hold in certain circumstances. My aim here is to dissolve any appearance of paradox or counter-intuitiveness of the phenomenon in question by articulating an alternative explanation which rests upon a (plaus…
Exemplars and Individual Responsibility in Agency-Stultifying Situations
The aim of this article is to present the problem of individual responsibility in (what we call) agency-stultifying situations and examine whether exemplarism can be a more promising way of addressing it than prevailing moral theories. Agency-stultifying situations are situations in which the actions of a sufficiently large number of individuals produce a cumulative harm, but where none of these individuals, in isolation, can make a difference in…
Philosophy (3 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Ethics in medical practice (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (2 works) · Agency (philosophy (1 work) · Humanities (1 work) · Law and economics (1 work) · Phenomenon (1 work)