Nicolas Schutz
Biographic Data
| ID | 5729108 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nicolas Schutz |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nicolas |
| FAMILY NAME | Schutz |
| SIGNATURE | SCHUTZ N |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Surrey |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0481-9350 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade
In a two-country international trade model with oligopolistic competition, we study the conditions on market structure and trade costs under which a merger policy designed to benefit domestic consumers is too tough or too lenient from the viewpoint of the foreign country. We calibrate the model to match industry-level data in the U.S. and Canada. Our results suggest that at present levels of trade costs, merger policy is too tough in the vast maj…
Upstream Competition between Vertically Integrated Firms
We propose a model of two‐tier competition between vertically integrated firms and unintegrated downstream firms. We show that, even when integrated firms compete in prices to offer a homogeneous input, the B ertrand logic may collapse, and the input may be priced above marginal cost in equilibrium. These partial foreclosure equilibria are more likely to exist when downstream competition is fierce or when unintegrated downstream competitors are r…
No prominent works on this page.
Upstream Competition between Vertically Integrated Firms
We propose a model of two‐tier competition between vertically integrated firms and unintegrated downstream firms. We show that, even when integrated firms compete in prices to offer a homogeneous input, the B ertrand logic may collapse, and the input may be priced above marginal cost in equilibrium. These partial foreclosure equilibria are more likely to exist when downstream competition is fierce or when unintegrated downstream competitors are r…
Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade
In a two-country international trade model with oligopolistic competition, we study the conditions on market structure and trade costs under which a merger policy designed to benefit domestic consumers is too tough or too lenient from the viewpoint of the foreign country. We calibrate the model to match industry-level data in the U.S. and Canada. Our results suggest that at present levels of trade costs, merger policy is too tough in the vast maj…
Business (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Merger and Competition Analysis (2 works) · Competitor analysis (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Digital Platforms and Economics (1 work) · Foreclosure (1 work) · Global Trade and Competitiveness (1 work) · Global trade and economics (1 work) · Homogeneous (1 work)