Upstream Competition between Vertically Integrated Firms
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19035850 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Marc Bourreau (0000-0003-3913-3014, ENST and CREST‐LEI Department of Economics and Social Sciences 46 rue Barrault 75634 France, corresponding author), Johan Hombert (HEC 1 rue de la Libération 78351 Jouy‐en‐Josas France, corresponding author), Jérôme Pouyet (0000-0003-3751-1552, Paris School of Economics Ecole Polytechnique and CEPR 48 Boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris France, corresponding author), Nicolas Schutz (0000-0002-0481-9350, Department of Economics University of Mannheim 68131 Mannheim Germany, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 677-713 |
| Publication date | 2011-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Industrial Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-1821 • E-ISSN: 1467-6451 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2011.00469.x |
| OpenAlex | W1827513203 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 17 |
We propose a model of two‐tier competition between vertically integrated firms and unintegrated downstream firms. We show that, even when integrated firms compete in prices to offer a homogeneous input, the B ertrand logic may collapse, and the input may be priced above marginal cost in equilibrium. These partial foreclosure equilibria are more likely to exist when downstream competition is fierce or when unintegrated downstream competitors are relatively inefficient. We discuss the impact of several regulatory tools on the competitiveness of the wholesale market
Business · Competitor analysis · Economics · Foreclosure · Homogeneous · Industrial organization · Marginal cost · Microeconomics · Telecommunications · Vertical Integration · Computer Science · Digital Platforms and Economics · ICT Impact and Policies · Merger and Competition Analysis · Marketing
| Citations per year | 0.27 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2011 - 2021 (11) |
| Highly cited | No |