Michael R Baye
Biographic Data
| ID | 5729150 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael R Baye |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael R |
| FAMILY NAME | Baye |
| SIGNATURE | BAYE M R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Indiana University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 49 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1987 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
On the Optimality of Clickthrough Fees in Online Markets
We study optimal fee setting decisions by a monopoly online platform connecting advertisers with potential buyers in two environments: a simple model that captures stylised features of advertising on search engines, social networks and advertisement‐supported email; and a richer model that is more relevant for 'directed' search at price comparison sites. While the platform can choose to charge for both impressions and clicks, we show that the pla…
Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction‐Theoretic Approach
A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case. Rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skilful attorneys. This framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures…
The incidence of overdissipation in rent-seeking contests
The all-pay auction with complete information
Repeated Games with Stochastic Discounting
This paper provides folk theorems for infinitely repeated games where the discount factor is stochastic. When discount factors are independently distributed and the current discount fac- tor is unobservable prior to current actions, standard trigger strategies support a 'full' folk theorem when the infimum of the mean of the sequence of discount factors is sufficiently close to one. When players choose actions in each period after having observed…
The solution to the Tullock rent-seeking game when R>2: Mixed-strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates
Choosing Sides in Matching Games: Nash Equilibria and Comparative Statics
This paper characterizes equilibria in matching games where the institutional setting allows players to choose whether to become buyers, sellers, or not to participate in economic activity. Nash equilibrium consists of a partition of agents into buyers, sellers, and non-participants such that agents in each group do not have an incentive to change their activity given the behaviour of other agents. Comparative-static analysis demonstrates that, w…
Information, Multiprice Search, and Cost-of-Living Index Theory
This paper derives the cost-of-living index of an individual who faces imperfect and costly information about prices. Traditional cost-of-living in dexes assume that the consumer passively accepts prices as given. The authors derive a multiprice search model in which the consumer choos es the search strategy that minimizes the expected cost of buying a g iven level of utility. In contrast to existing search models, the mod el allows the consumer …
The solution to the Tullock rent-seeking game when R>2: Mixed-strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates
Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction‐Theoretic Approach
A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case. Rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skilful attorneys. This framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures…
The incidence of overdissipation in rent-seeking contests
On the Optimality of Clickthrough Fees in Online Markets
We study optimal fee setting decisions by a monopoly online platform connecting advertisers with potential buyers in two environments: a simple model that captures stylised features of advertising on search engines, social networks and advertisement‐supported email; and a richer model that is more relevant for 'directed' search at price comparison sites. While the platform can choose to charge for both impressions and clicks, we show that the pla…
Information, Multiprice Search, and Cost-of-Living Index Theory
This paper derives the cost-of-living index of an individual who faces imperfect and costly information about prices. Traditional cost-of-living in dexes assume that the consumer passively accepts prices as given. The authors derive a multiprice search model in which the consumer choos es the search strategy that minimizes the expected cost of buying a g iven level of utility. In contrast to existing search models, the mod el allows the consumer …
Information, Multiprice Search, and Cost-of-Living Index Theory
This paper derives the cost-of-living index of an individual who faces imperfect and costly information about prices. Traditional cost-of-living in dexes assume that the consumer passively accepts prices as given. The authors derive a multiprice search model in which the consumer choos es the search strategy that minimizes the expected cost of buying a g iven level of utility. In contrast to existing search models, the mod el allows the consumer …
Choosing Sides in Matching Games: Nash Equilibria and Comparative Statics
This paper characterizes equilibria in matching games where the institutional setting allows players to choose whether to become buyers, sellers, or not to participate in economic activity. Nash equilibrium consists of a partition of agents into buyers, sellers, and non-participants such that agents in each group do not have an incentive to change their activity given the behaviour of other agents. Comparative-static analysis demonstrates that, w…
The solution to the Tullock rent-seeking game when R>2: Mixed-strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates
The all-pay auction with complete information
Repeated Games with Stochastic Discounting
This paper provides folk theorems for infinitely repeated games where the discount factor is stochastic. When discount factors are independently distributed and the current discount fac- tor is unobservable prior to current actions, standard trigger strategies support a 'full' folk theorem when the infimum of the mean of the sequence of discount factors is sufficiently close to one. When players choose actions in each period after having observed…
The incidence of overdissipation in rent-seeking contests
Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction‐Theoretic Approach
A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case. Rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skilful attorneys. This framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures…
On the Optimality of Clickthrough Fees in Online Markets
We study optimal fee setting decisions by a monopoly online platform connecting advertisers with potential buyers in two environments: a simple model that captures stylised features of advertising on search engines, social networks and advertisement‐supported email; and a richer model that is more relevant for 'directed' search at price comparison sites. While the platform can choose to charge for both impressions and clicks, we show that the pla…
Economics (7 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (6 works) · Economic theories and models (5 works) · Mathematical economics (5 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Finance (3 works) · Best response (2 works)