Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems
An Auction‐Theoretic Approach
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9703018 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael R Baye (Indiana University), Dan Kovenock (0009-0001-8823-9547, Purdue University), Casper G de Vries (Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 115 |
| Issue | 505 |
| Pages | 583-601 |
| Publication date | 2005-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01010.x |
| OpenAlex | W3123110289 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 12 |
| References cited | 19 |
A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case. Rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skilful attorneys. This framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under a continuum of legal systems. The British rule, Continental rule, American rule, and some recently proposed legal reforms are special cases of our model
Art history · Erasmus · Law and economics · Library science · Sociology · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · History · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Merger and Competition Analysis
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| Unique citing works | 12 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,57 |
| Citation span | 2005 - 2025 (21) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |