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Richard Romano

Biographic Data

ID5729286
NAMERichard Romano
GIVEN NAMESRichard
FAMILY NAMERomano
SIGNATUREROMANO R
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Florida
ORCID0000-0003-4961-4559
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS4
TOTAL CITATIONS29
AUTHOR COUNT4
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1988
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2006
H-INDEX1
  • Profiling in Bargaining Over College Tuition

    Open Access•Dennis Epple, Richard Romano et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2006•References: 16

    Profiling in college admissions arises when applicant attributes are given weight because they are correlated with unobservable student characteristics that the college values. The article models the admission process of a single college as a bargaining game between the college and a potential student with sequential moves and asymmetric information. We test the empirical implications of this model using a unique data set from a private college i…

  • Ends against the middle: Determining public service provision when there are private alternatives

    Open Access•Dennis Epple, Richard Romano et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Public Economics•1996

  • Public Provision of Private Goods

    Dennis Epple, Richard Romano et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1996•Cited by: 29•References: 6

    Government may provide a good that can, if legally permitted, be supplemented by private purchases. Policy is determined by majority rule. Under standard assumptions on preferences, a majority voting equilibrium exists. A regime of positive government provision with no restriction on private supplements is shown to be majority preferred to a regime of either only market provision or only government provision. Combined public and private expenditu…

  • A Note on Vertical Integration: Price Discrimination and Successive Monopoly

    Richard Romano, Richard E Romano•ARTICLE•Economica•1988

    An upstream monopolist that services multiple downstream monopolists has a dual incentive to integra te vertically with any of them. Through integration, the upstream mon opolist can practice implicit price discrimination and also resolve t he pricing inefficiency associated with successive monopoly. The down stream industries can be divided into a set for which integration wit h the upstream monopolist leads to a Pareto improvement and the compl…

  • Public Provision of Private Goods

    Dennis Epple, Richard Romano et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1996•Cited by: 29•References: 6

    Government may provide a good that can, if legally permitted, be supplemented by private purchases. Policy is determined by majority rule. Under standard assumptions on preferences, a majority voting equilibrium exists. A regime of positive government provision with no restriction on private supplements is shown to be majority preferred to a regime of either only market provision or only government provision. Combined public and private expenditu…

  • A Note on Vertical Integration: Price Discrimination and Successive Monopoly

    Richard Romano, Richard E Romano•ARTICLE•Economica•1988

    An upstream monopolist that services multiple downstream monopolists has a dual incentive to integra te vertically with any of them. Through integration, the upstream mon opolist can practice implicit price discrimination and also resolve t he pricing inefficiency associated with successive monopoly. The down stream industries can be divided into a set for which integration wit h the upstream monopolist leads to a Pareto improvement and the compl…

  • Ends against the middle: Determining public service provision when there are private alternatives

    Open Access•Dennis Epple, Richard Romano et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Public Economics•1996

  • Public Provision of Private Goods

    Dennis Epple, Richard Romano et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1996•Cited by: 29•References: 6

    Government may provide a good that can, if legally permitted, be supplemented by private purchases. Policy is determined by majority rule. Under standard assumptions on preferences, a majority voting equilibrium exists. A regime of positive government provision with no restriction on private supplements is shown to be majority preferred to a regime of either only market provision or only government provision. Combined public and private expenditu…

  • Profiling in Bargaining Over College Tuition

    Open Access•Dennis Epple, Richard Romano et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2006•References: 16

    Profiling in college admissions arises when applicant attributes are given weight because they are correlated with unobservable student characteristics that the college values. The article models the admission process of a single college as a bargaining game between the college and a potential student with sequential moves and asymmetric information. We test the empirical implications of this model using a unique data set from a private college i…

Economics (4 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (2 works) · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics (2 works) · Majority rule (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Public economics (2 works) · Public good (2 works) · Voting (2 works)

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