Profiling in Bargaining Over College Tuition

Bibliographic Data

ID9703205
AuthorsDennis Epple (0000-0002-7354-5728, Carnegie Mellon University and NBER), Richard Romano (0000-0003-4961-4559, University of Florida), Sinan Sarpça (0000-0003-4011-3985, Koç University), Holger Sieg (0000-0002-0593-0173, Carnegie Mellon University and NBER)
Year2006
Volume116
Issue515
PagesF459-F479
Publication date2006-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01132.x
OpenAlexW2108687796
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited19

Profiling in college admissions arises when applicant attributes are given weight because they are correlated with unobservable student characteristics that the college values. The article models the admission process of a single college as a bargaining game between the college and a potential student with sequential moves and asymmetric information. We test the empirical implications of this model using a unique data set from a private college in the US. We find that the empirical evidence is consistent with the notion that signalling and profiling are important aspects of the college admission process. Copyright 2006 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2006

Economics · Profiling (computer programming · Programming language · Computer Science · Higher Education Research Studies · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · School Choice and Performance

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