Holger Sieg
Biographic Data
| ID | 5729288 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Holger Sieg |
| GIVEN NAMES | Holger |
| FAMILY NAME | Sieg |
| SIGNATURE | SIEG H |
| AFFILIATIONS | Carnegie Mellon University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0593-0173 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 64 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Electoral Accountability and Control in US Cities
We consider a dynamic game of electoral competition with adverse selection, moral hazard, and imperfect monitoring. We show that this dynamic game can be estimated using a flexible maximum likelihood estimator. We implement the estimator using data from recent mayoral elections in large US cities with binding two-term limits. Our empirical findings suggest that there are large differences in performance among different types of mayors. We find an…
A New Approach to Estimating Equilibrium Models for Metropolitan Housing Markets
We provide a new estimator for a broad class of equilibrium models of metropolitan housing markets with housing differentiated by quality. Quality is a latent variable that captures all features of a dwelling and its environment. We estimate the model for Chicago and New York, obtaining hedonic housing price functions for each quality level for each metropolitan area, stocks of each quality, and compensating variations required for a household of…
Admitting Students to Selective Education Programs: Merit, Profiling, and Affirmative Action
Minority and disadvantaged students are typically underrepresented in selective programs that use merit-based admission. Urban school districts may set different referral and admission thresholds based on income and race (affirmative action), and they may exploit differences in achievement relative to ability across race and income groups (profiling). We develop and estimate a model that provides a unified treatment of affirmative action and prof…
Consumer Demand under Price Uncertainty: Empirical Evidence from the Market for Cigarettes
We develop a demand model for goods that are subject to habit formation. We show that consumption plans of forward-looking individuals depend on preferences, current period prices, and individual beliefs about the evolution of future prices. Moreover, an increase in price uncertainty reduces consumption along the optimal path. With smoking as our application, we test the predictions of our model using a unique data set of prices for cigarettes an…
Profiling in Bargaining Over College Tuition
Profiling in college admissions arises when applicant attributes are given weight because they are correlated with unobservable student characteristics that the college values. The article models the admission process of a single college as a bargaining game between the college and a potential student with sequential moves and asymmetric information. We test the empirical implications of this model using a unique data set from a private college i…
Kernel Estimation of Average Derivatives and Differences
In this article we consider the problem of estimating average derivatives and differences using kernel estimators. Our analysis focuses on developing new methods that are appropriate in the context of bounded and discrete regressors and do not require higher-order kernels for consistency or asymptotic normality. We derive a new nonparametric estimator that we call the average difference estimator. We show that this estimator is consistent and roo…
Charitable Giving, Income, and Taxes: An Analysis of Panel Data
Charitable Giving, Income, and Taxes: An Analysis of Panel Data by Gerald E. Auten, Holger Sieg and Charles T. Clotfelter. Published in volume 92, issue 1, pages 371-382 of American Economic Review, March 2002
Interjurisdictional housing prices in locational equilibrium
Estimating a Bargaining Model with Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Medical Malpractice Disputes
This article uses a unique data set on medical malpractice disputes in Florida to estimate the parameters of a bargaining game with asymmetric information. The main findings of the article suggest that the bargaining game can replicate most of the qualitative and quantitative features of the data. The article also simulates alternative policy regimes to quantify the effects of possible tort reforms, such as imposing limits on contingency fees and…
Estimating Equilibrium Models of Local Jurisdictions
Research over the past several years has led to the development of models characterizing equilibrium in a system of local jurisdictions. An important insight from these models is that plausible single‐crossing assumptions about preferences generate strong predictions about the equilibrium distribution of households across communities. To date, these predictions have not subjected to formal empirical tests. The purpose of this paper is to provide …
A Microeconometric Comparison of Household Behavior Between Countries
This article reviews the methodological issues associated with estimating and testing competitive markets with panel data and applies it to an important new arena, international economics. We investigate differences in housing consumption and male labor supply across households in Germany and the United States with data from the German Socio Economic Panel and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Observations are treated as equilibrium outcomes, g…
Estimating Equilibrium Models of Local Jurisdictions
Research over the past several years has led to the development of models characterizing equilibrium in a system of local jurisdictions. An important insight from these models is that plausible single‐crossing assumptions about preferences generate strong predictions about the equilibrium distribution of households across communities. To date, these predictions have not subjected to formal empirical tests. The purpose of this paper is to provide …
Interjurisdictional housing prices in locational equilibrium
Estimating a Bargaining Model with Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Medical Malpractice Disputes
This article uses a unique data set on medical malpractice disputes in Florida to estimate the parameters of a bargaining game with asymmetric information. The main findings of the article suggest that the bargaining game can replicate most of the qualitative and quantitative features of the data. The article also simulates alternative policy regimes to quantify the effects of possible tort reforms, such as imposing limits on contingency fees and…
A New Approach to Estimating Equilibrium Models for Metropolitan Housing Markets
We provide a new estimator for a broad class of equilibrium models of metropolitan housing markets with housing differentiated by quality. Quality is a latent variable that captures all features of a dwelling and its environment. We estimate the model for Chicago and New York, obtaining hedonic housing price functions for each quality level for each metropolitan area, stocks of each quality, and compensating variations required for a household of…
Admitting Students to Selective Education Programs: Merit, Profiling, and Affirmative Action
Minority and disadvantaged students are typically underrepresented in selective programs that use merit-based admission. Urban school districts may set different referral and admission thresholds based on income and race (affirmative action), and they may exploit differences in achievement relative to ability across race and income groups (profiling). We develop and estimate a model that provides a unified treatment of affirmative action and prof…
A Microeconometric Comparison of Household Behavior Between Countries
This article reviews the methodological issues associated with estimating and testing competitive markets with panel data and applies it to an important new arena, international economics. We investigate differences in housing consumption and male labor supply across households in Germany and the United States with data from the German Socio Economic Panel and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Observations are treated as equilibrium outcomes, g…
Estimating Equilibrium Models of Local Jurisdictions
Research over the past several years has led to the development of models characterizing equilibrium in a system of local jurisdictions. An important insight from these models is that plausible single‐crossing assumptions about preferences generate strong predictions about the equilibrium distribution of households across communities. To date, these predictions have not subjected to formal empirical tests. The purpose of this paper is to provide …
Estimating a Bargaining Model with Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Medical Malpractice Disputes
This article uses a unique data set on medical malpractice disputes in Florida to estimate the parameters of a bargaining game with asymmetric information. The main findings of the article suggest that the bargaining game can replicate most of the qualitative and quantitative features of the data. The article also simulates alternative policy regimes to quantify the effects of possible tort reforms, such as imposing limits on contingency fees and…
Charitable Giving, Income, and Taxes: An Analysis of Panel Data
Charitable Giving, Income, and Taxes: An Analysis of Panel Data by Gerald E. Auten, Holger Sieg and Charles T. Clotfelter. Published in volume 92, issue 1, pages 371-382 of American Economic Review, March 2002
Interjurisdictional housing prices in locational equilibrium
Kernel Estimation of Average Derivatives and Differences
In this article we consider the problem of estimating average derivatives and differences using kernel estimators. Our analysis focuses on developing new methods that are appropriate in the context of bounded and discrete regressors and do not require higher-order kernels for consistency or asymptotic normality. We derive a new nonparametric estimator that we call the average difference estimator. We show that this estimator is consistent and roo…
Profiling in Bargaining Over College Tuition
Profiling in college admissions arises when applicant attributes are given weight because they are correlated with unobservable student characteristics that the college values. The article models the admission process of a single college as a bargaining game between the college and a potential student with sequential moves and asymmetric information. We test the empirical implications of this model using a unique data set from a private college i…
Consumer Demand under Price Uncertainty: Empirical Evidence from the Market for Cigarettes
We develop a demand model for goods that are subject to habit formation. We show that consumption plans of forward-looking individuals depend on preferences, current period prices, and individual beliefs about the evolution of future prices. Moreover, an increase in price uncertainty reduces consumption along the optimal path. With smoking as our application, we test the predictions of our model using a unique data set of prices for cigarettes an…
Admitting Students to Selective Education Programs: Merit, Profiling, and Affirmative Action
Minority and disadvantaged students are typically underrepresented in selective programs that use merit-based admission. Urban school districts may set different referral and admission thresholds based on income and race (affirmative action), and they may exploit differences in achievement relative to ability across race and income groups (profiling). We develop and estimate a model that provides a unified treatment of affirmative action and prof…
A New Approach to Estimating Equilibrium Models for Metropolitan Housing Markets
We provide a new estimator for a broad class of equilibrium models of metropolitan housing markets with housing differentiated by quality. Quality is a latent variable that captures all features of a dwelling and its environment. We estimate the model for Chicago and New York, obtaining hedonic housing price functions for each quality level for each metropolitan area, stocks of each quality, and compensating variations required for a household of…
Electoral Accountability and Control in US Cities
We consider a dynamic game of electoral competition with adverse selection, moral hazard, and imperfect monitoring. We show that this dynamic game can be estimated using a flexible maximum likelihood estimator. We implement the estimator using data from recent mayoral elections in large US cities with binding two-term limits. Our empirical findings suggest that there are large differences in performance among different types of mayors. We find an…
Economics (10 works) · Econometrics (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Statistics (6 works) · Housing Market and Economics (5 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Law (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works)