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Kevin A McCabe

Biographic Data

ID5729445
NAMEKevin A McCabe
GIVEN NAMESKevin A
FAMILY NAMEMcCabe
SIGNATUREMCCABE K A
AFFILIATIONSGeorge Mason University
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS3
TOTAL CITATIONS2
AUTHOR COUNT3
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1992
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2007
H-INDEX1
  • Sustaining Cooperation in Trust Games

    Open Access•Mary L Rigdon, Kevin A McCabe et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2007•Cited by: 1•References: 11

    It is well known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner's Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Without knowing it, players are typed based on their recent track record as to whether or not they are trusting (Players 1) and whether or not they are trustworthy (Players 2). They are the…

  • Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games

    Open Access•Kevin A McCabe, Kevin McCabe et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Behavior &…•2003

  • Designing Call Auction Institutions: Is Double Dutch The Best

    Kevin A McCabe, Kevin McCabe et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1992•Cited by: 1

    Journal Article Designing Call Auction Institutions: Is Double Dutch The Best? Get access Kevin A. McCabe, Kevin A. McCabe University of Arizona Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Stephen J. Rassenti, Stephen J. Rassenti University of Arizona Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Vernon L. Smith Vernon L. Smith University of Arizona Search for other works by this author on: …

  • Sustaining Cooperation in Trust Games

    Open Access•Mary L Rigdon, Kevin A McCabe et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2007•Cited by: 1•References: 11

    It is well known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner's Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Without knowing it, players are typed based on their recent track record as to whether or not they are trusting (Players 1) and whether or not they are trustworthy (Players 2). They are the…

  • Designing Call Auction Institutions: Is Double Dutch The Best

    Kevin A McCabe, Kevin McCabe et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1992•Cited by: 1

    Journal Article Designing Call Auction Institutions: Is Double Dutch The Best? Get access Kevin A. McCabe, Kevin A. McCabe University of Arizona Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Stephen J. Rassenti, Stephen J. Rassenti University of Arizona Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Vernon L. Smith Vernon L. Smith University of Arizona Search for other works by this author on: …

  • Designing Call Auction Institutions: Is Double Dutch The Best

    Kevin A McCabe, Kevin McCabe et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1992•Cited by: 1

    Journal Article Designing Call Auction Institutions: Is Double Dutch The Best? Get access Kevin A. McCabe, Kevin A. McCabe University of Arizona Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Stephen J. Rassenti, Stephen J. Rassenti University of Arizona Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Vernon L. Smith Vernon L. Smith University of Arizona Search for other works by this author on: …

  • Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games

    Open Access•Kevin A McCabe, Kevin McCabe et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Behavior &…•2003

  • Sustaining Cooperation in Trust Games

    Open Access•Mary L Rigdon, Kevin A McCabe et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2007•Cited by: 1•References: 11

    It is well known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner's Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Without knowing it, players are typed based on their recent track record as to whether or not they are trusting (Players 1) and whether or not they are trustworthy (Players 2). They are the…

Computer Science (2 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works) · Sociology (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works) · Attribution (1 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 works) · Cluster analysis (1 works)

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