Sustaining Cooperation in Trust Games
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9709039 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mary L Rigdon (0000-0002-4516-9999, University of Michigan), Kevin A McCabe (George Mason University), Kevin McCabe (0000-0003-0544-157X, George Mason University), Vernon L Smith (0000-0001-7917-1870, George Mason University) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 117 |
| Issue | 522 |
| Pages | 991-1007 |
| Publication date | 2007-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02075.x |
| OpenAlex | W1531915106 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 11 |
It is well known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner's Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Without knowing it, players are typed based on their recent track record as to whether or not they are trusting (Players 1) and whether or not they are trustworthy (Players 2). They are then paired according to those types: trustors with trustworthy types, and similarly non-trustors with untrustworthy types. In the control comparisons, Players 1 are randomly repaired with Players 2 without regard to type. We ask: are there natural tendencies for people to cooperate more frequently in environments in which they experience more cooperation in comparison with controls? Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007
Cluster analysis · Control (management · Dilemma · Population · Sociology · Trustworthiness · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Demography · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology
Public Goods
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
Cooperation in PD Games
Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Social Welfare, Cooperators' Advantage, and the Option of Not Playing the Game
Fairness and Retaliation
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,17 |
| Citation span | 2008 - 2019 (12) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |