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Mary L Rigdon

Biographic Data

ID5732442
NAMEMary L Rigdon
GIVEN NAMESMary L
FAMILY NAMERigdon
SIGNATURERIGDON M L
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Michigan
ORCID0000-0002-4516-9999
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS4
TOTAL CITATIONS13
AUTHOR COUNT4
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2003
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2021
H-INDEX1
  • Option to cooperate increases women's competitiveness and closes the gender gap

    Open Access•Alessandra Cassar, Mary L Rigdon•ARTICLE•Evolution and Human Behavior•2021

  • Minimal social cues in the dictator game

    Open Access•Mary L Rigdon, Mary Rigdon et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Psychology•2009•Cited by: 12•References: 43

  • Sustaining Cooperation in Trust Games

    Open Access•Mary L Rigdon, Kevin A McCabe et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2007•Cited by: 1•References: 11

    It is well known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner's Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Without knowing it, players are typed based on their recent track record as to whether or not they are trusting (Players 1) and whether or not they are trustworthy (Players 2). They are the…

  • Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games

    Open Access•Kevin A McCabe, Kevin McCabe et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Behavior &…•2003

  • Minimal social cues in the dictator game

    Open Access•Mary L Rigdon, Mary Rigdon et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Psychology•2009•Cited by: 12•References: 43

  • Sustaining Cooperation in Trust Games

    Open Access•Mary L Rigdon, Kevin A McCabe et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2007•Cited by: 1•References: 11

    It is well known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner's Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Without knowing it, players are typed based on their recent track record as to whether or not they are trusting (Players 1) and whether or not they are trustworthy (Players 2). They are the…

  • Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games

    Open Access•Kevin A McCabe, Kevin McCabe et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Behavior &…•2003

  • Sustaining Cooperation in Trust Games

    Open Access•Mary L Rigdon, Kevin A McCabe et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2007•Cited by: 1•References: 11

    It is well known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner's Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Without knowing it, players are typed based on their recent track record as to whether or not they are trusting (Players 1) and whether or not they are trustworthy (Players 2). They are the…

  • Minimal social cues in the dictator game

    Open Access•Mary L Rigdon, Mary Rigdon et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Psychology•2009•Cited by: 12•References: 43

  • Option to cooperate increases women's competitiveness and closes the gender gap

    Open Access•Alessandra Cassar, Mary L Rigdon•ARTICLE•Evolution and Human Behavior•2021

Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (4 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Dictator game (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works)

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