Vera Zaporozhets
Biographic Data
| ID | 5729648 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Vera Zaporozhets |
| GIVEN NAMES | Vera |
| FAMILY NAME | Zaporozhets |
| SIGNATURE | ZAPOROZHETS V |
| AFFILIATIONS | KU Leuven |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6433-3240 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Bargaining Over Environmental Budgets
Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics
Sequential Legislative Lobbying under Political Certainty
In this article, we analyse the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, based on Groseclose and Snyder (1996) , describing a legislature that votes on two alternatives and two opposing lobbies, lobby 0 and lobby 1, that compete by bidding for legislators' votes. In this model there is a strong second-mover advantage, so the lobbyist moving first will make offers to legislators only if he deters any credible counter-reactio…
Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics
Sequential Legislative Lobbying under Political Certainty
In this article, we analyse the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, based on Groseclose and Snyder (1996) , describing a legislature that votes on two alternatives and two opposing lobbies, lobby 0 and lobby 1, that compete by bidding for legislators' votes. In this model there is a strong second-mover advantage, so the lobbyist moving first will make offers to legislators only if he deters any credible counter-reactio…
Sequential Legislative Lobbying under Political Certainty
In this article, we analyse the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, based on Groseclose and Snyder (1996) , describing a legislature that votes on two alternatives and two opposing lobbies, lobby 0 and lobby 1, that compete by bidding for legislators' votes. In this model there is a strong second-mover advantage, so the lobbyist moving first will make offers to legislators only if he deters any credible counter-reactio…
Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics
Bargaining Over Environmental Budgets
Game Theory and Voting Systems (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 works) · Business (1 works)