Sequential Legislative Lobbying under Political Certainty
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9703763 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michel Le Breton (Toulouse School of Economics), Vera Zaporozhets (0000-0001-6433-3240, KU Leuven) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 120 |
| Issue | 543 |
| Pages | 281-312 |
| Publication date | 2010-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02295.x |
| OpenAlex | W2098529083 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 35 |
In this article, we analyse the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, based on Groseclose and Snyder (1996) , describing a legislature that votes on two alternatives and two opposing lobbies, lobby 0 and lobby 1, that compete by bidding for legislators' votes. In this model there is a strong second-mover advantage, so the lobbyist moving first will make offers to legislators only if he deters any credible counter-reaction from his opponent, i.e. if he anticipates winning the battle. Our main focus is on the calculation of the smallest budget that he needs to win the game and on the distribution of this budget across the legislators. We study the impact of game's key parameters on these two variables and show the connection of this problem with the combinatorics of sets and notions from cooperative game theory. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009
Certainty · Epistemology · Legislature · Media studies · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · History · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Philosophy
Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures
Vote Buying
The desirability relation of simple games
Vote Buying, Supermajorities, and Flooded Coalitions
Buying Supermajorities
Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures
A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,29 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2019 (8) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |