Lobbying dynamics
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6298347 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David P Baron (0000-0001-5551-2802, Stanford University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 31 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 403-452 |
| Publication date | 2019-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629819850630 |
| OpenAlex | W4232461332 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 39 |
Many if not most government policies, regulations, and laws continue in effect unless changed by the legislature, providing a natural dynamic to the political process. Lobbying is a ubiquitous component of that process and can affect both proposal making and voting. This paper characterizes Markov perfect equilibria of a dynamic legislative bargaining model with stable policies and durable coalitions despite lobbying. Interest groups aligned with challenges to the incumbent coalition have a greater willingness to pay than have the defending interest groups, but the defenders have a legislative incumbency advantage in needing to counter-lobby fewer legislators than the challengers lobby. If legislators are sufficiently patient, equilibria exist such that the defenders of the incumbent coalition are successful. More than a minimal majority may be lobbied by the challengers, and coalitions can be surplus. Lobbying can increase proposal power, resulting in a more unequal distribution within a coalition
Economics · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Legislature · Markov perfect equilibrium · Microeconomics · Nash equilibrium · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Public economics · Voting · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying
Lobbying and Policy Change
Revolving Door Lobbyists
Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process
Participation and the provision of discrete public goods
On Buying Legislatures
Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures
Vote Buying
Lobbying and asymmetric information
Vote Buying
Dynamic Collective Choice with Endogenous Status Quo
Sequential Legislative Lobbying under Political Certainty
Ex Post Lobbying
The Micro-Dynamics of Coalition Formation
Theory and Evidence for Counteractive Lobbying
Counteractive Lobbying
Vote Buying, Supermajorities, and Flooded Coalitions
Bargaining in Legislatures
Buying Supermajorities
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
Buying Time
Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures
Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |