Francisco Martínez-Mora
Biographic Data
| ID | 5729682 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Francisco Martínez-Mora |
| GIVEN NAMES | Francisco |
| FAMILY NAME | Martínez-Mora |
| SIGNATURE | MARTÍNEZ-MORA F |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Leicester, UK and INARB (Universidad Pública de Navarra), Spain |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0839-2569 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Random assignments and outside options
School Choice Design, Risk Aversion and Cardinal Segregation
We embed the problem of public school choice design in a model of local provision of education. We define cardinal (student) segregation as that emerging when families with identical ordinal preferences submit different rankings of schools in a centralised school choice procedure. With the Boston Mechanism (BM), when higher types are less risk-averse, and there is sufficient vertical differentiation of schools, any equilibrium presents cardinal s…
The desegregating effect of school tracking
School Choice Design, Risk Aversion and Cardinal Segregation
We embed the problem of public school choice design in a model of local provision of education. We define cardinal (student) segregation as that emerging when families with identical ordinal preferences submit different rankings of schools in a centralised school choice procedure. With the Boston Mechanism (BM), when higher types are less risk-averse, and there is sufficient vertical differentiation of schools, any equilibrium presents cardinal s…
The desegregating effect of school tracking
The desegregating effect of school tracking
Random assignments and outside options
School Choice Design, Risk Aversion and Cardinal Segregation
We embed the problem of public school choice design in a model of local provision of education. We define cardinal (student) segregation as that emerging when families with identical ordinal preferences submit different rankings of schools in a centralised school choice procedure. With the Boston Mechanism (BM), when higher types are less risk-averse, and there is sufficient vertical differentiation of schools, any equilibrium presents cardinal s…
Economics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 works) · Mathematical economics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · School Choice and Performance (2 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 works) · Competition (biology (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works) · Demographic economics (1 works)