School Choice Design, Risk Aversion and Cardinal Segregation

Bibliographic Data

ID9703804
AuthorsCaterina Calsamiglia (0000-0003-2079-7179, ICREA and IPEG, Spain, corresponding author), Francisco Martínez-Mora (0000-0002-0839-2569, University of Leicester, UK and INARB (Universidad Pública de Navarra), Spain), Antonio Miralles (0000-0001-8146-2140, University of Messina, Italy and Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona (on leave) and Barcelona GSE, Spain)
Year2021
Volume131
Issue635
Pages1081-1104
Publication date2021-04-09
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/ej/ueaa095
OpenAlexW3121290441
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited64

We embed the problem of public school choice design in a model of local provision of education. We define cardinal (student) segregation as that emerging when families with identical ordinal preferences submit different rankings of schools in a centralised school choice procedure. With the Boston Mechanism (BM), when higher types are less risk-averse, and there is sufficient vertical differentiation of schools, any equilibrium presents cardinal segregation. Transportation costs facilitate the emergence of cardinal segregation as does competition from private schools. Furthermore, the latter renders the best public schools more elitist. The Deferred Acceptance mechanism is resilient to cardinal segregation

Competition (biology · Economics · Epistemology · Expected utility hypothesis · Mathematical economics · Mechanism (biology · Microeconomics · Risk aversion (psychology · School choice · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Game Theory and Voting Systems · School Choice and Performance

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