Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices
The Boston Mechanism versus Its Alternatives
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10179595 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Caterina Calsamiglia (0000-0003-2079-7179, Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats), Chao Fu (0000-0002-1455-080X, National Bureau of Economic Research), Maia Güell (0000-0003-4701-9887, Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 128 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 642-680 |
| Publication date | 2019-05-21 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/704573 |
| OpenAlex | W2133178863 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 29 |
We model household choice of schools under the Boston mechanism (BM) and develop a new method, applicable to a broad class of mechanisms, to fully solve the choice problem even if it is infeasible via the traditional method. We estimate the joint distribution of household preferences and sophistication types, using administrative data from Barcelona. Counterfactual policy analyses show that a change from BM in Barcelona to the deferred-acceptance mechanism would decrease average welfare by €1,020, while a change to the top-trading-cycles mechanism would increase average welfare by €460
Class (philosophy · Counterfactual thinking · Distribution (mathematics · Econometrics · Economics · Estimation · Management · Mechanism (biology · Microeconomics · School choice · Sociology · Sophistication · Structural estimation · Welfare · Computer Science · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics · Housing Market and Economics · Mathematics · Psychology
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| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,8 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2024 (4) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |