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Antonio Miralles

Biographic Data

ID5729683
NAMEAntonio Miralles
GIVEN NAMESAntonio
FAMILY NAMEMiralles
SIGNATUREMIRALLES A
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Messina, Italy and Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona (on leave) and Barcelona GSE, Spain
ORCID0000-0001-8146-2140
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS4
TOTAL CITATIONS33
AUTHOR COUNT4
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2003
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2021
H-INDEX2
  • Random assignments and outside options

    Open Access•Caterina Calsamiglia, Francisco Martínez-Mora et al.•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2021

  • School Choice Design, Risk Aversion and Cardinal Segregation

    Open Access•Caterina Calsamiglia, Francisco Martínez-Mora et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2021•Cited by: 5•References: 64

    We embed the problem of public school choice design in a model of local provision of education. We define cardinal (student) segregation as that emerging when families with identical ordinal preferences submit different rankings of schools in a centralised school choice procedure. With the Boston Mechanism (BM), when higher types are less risk-averse, and there is sufficient vertical differentiation of schools, any equilibrium presents cardinal s…

  • Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs

    Open Access•Antonio Miralles•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2008•References: 6

  • Factors Influencing the Privatisation of Urban Solid Waste Collection in Spain

    Open Access•Germà Bel, Antonio Miralles•ARTICLE•Urban Studies•2003•Cited by: 28•References: 9

    This paper analyses some of the organisational aspects of urban solid waste collection. It starts by discussing some of the theoretical issues of contracting out. Then, an explanatory model is specified and estimated on a sample of surveyed municipalities. The purpose is twofold: first, to identify the role of some economic factors when deciding to contract out the service; secondly, to analyse the role of politics in choosing between public prod…

  • Factors Influencing the Privatisation of Urban Solid Waste Collection in Spain

    Open Access•Germà Bel, Antonio Miralles•ARTICLE•Urban Studies•2003•Cited by: 28•References: 9

    This paper analyses some of the organisational aspects of urban solid waste collection. It starts by discussing some of the theoretical issues of contracting out. Then, an explanatory model is specified and estimated on a sample of surveyed municipalities. The purpose is twofold: first, to identify the role of some economic factors when deciding to contract out the service; secondly, to analyse the role of politics in choosing between public prod…

  • School Choice Design, Risk Aversion and Cardinal Segregation

    Open Access•Caterina Calsamiglia, Francisco Martínez-Mora et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2021•Cited by: 5•References: 64

    We embed the problem of public school choice design in a model of local provision of education. We define cardinal (student) segregation as that emerging when families with identical ordinal preferences submit different rankings of schools in a centralised school choice procedure. With the Boston Mechanism (BM), when higher types are less risk-averse, and there is sufficient vertical differentiation of schools, any equilibrium presents cardinal s…

  • Factors Influencing the Privatisation of Urban Solid Waste Collection in Spain

    Open Access•Germà Bel, Antonio Miralles•ARTICLE•Urban Studies•2003•Cited by: 28•References: 9

    This paper analyses some of the organisational aspects of urban solid waste collection. It starts by discussing some of the theoretical issues of contracting out. Then, an explanatory model is specified and estimated on a sample of surveyed municipalities. The purpose is twofold: first, to identify the role of some economic factors when deciding to contract out the service; secondly, to analyse the role of politics in choosing between public prod…

  • Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs

    Open Access•Antonio Miralles•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2008•References: 6

  • Random assignments and outside options

    Open Access•Caterina Calsamiglia, Francisco Martínez-Mora et al.•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2021

  • School Choice Design, Risk Aversion and Cardinal Segregation

    Open Access•Caterina Calsamiglia, Francisco Martínez-Mora et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2021•Cited by: 5•References: 64

    We embed the problem of public school choice design in a model of local provision of education. We define cardinal (student) segregation as that emerging when families with identical ordinal preferences submit different rankings of schools in a centralised school choice procedure. With the Boston Mechanism (BM), when higher types are less risk-averse, and there is sufficient vertical differentiation of schools, any equilibrium presents cardinal s…

Economics (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Public economics (2 works) · Business (1 works)

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