Henning Bohn
Biographic Data
| ID | 5730008 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Henning Bohn |
| GIVEN NAMES | Henning |
| FAMILY NAME | Bohn |
| SIGNATURE | BOHN H |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Santa Barbara |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1992 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The Economic Consequences of Rising U.S. Government Debt: Privileges at Risk
The rapidly growing federal government debt has become a concern for policy makers and the public. Yet the U.S. government has seemingly unbounded access to credit at low interest rates. Historically, Treasury yields have been below the growth rate of the economy. The paper examines the ramifications of debt financing at low interest rates. Given the short maturity of U.S. public debt — over $ 2.5 trillion maturing within a year — investor expect…
Ownership Risk, Investment, and the Use of Natural Resources
The effect of insecure ownership on ordinary investment and natural resource use is examined. Insecure ownership is postulated to depend on the type of government regime in power and the prevalence of political violence or instability. The political determinants of economywide investment are estimated from cross-country data, and the results are used to form an index of ownership security. When introduced into empirical models of natural resource…
The Behavior of U. S. Public Debt and Deficits
How do governments react to the accumulation of debt? Do they take corrective measures, or do they let the debt grow? Whereas standard time series tests cannot reject a unit root in the U. S. debt-GDP ratio, this paper provides evidence of corrective action: the U. S. primary surplus is an increasing function of the debt-GDP ratio. The debt-GDP ratio displays mean-reversion if one controls for war-time spending and for cyclical fluctuations. The …
Coordination Failure, Multiple Equilibria and Economic Institutions
Models of coordination failure have equilibria that are not first-best because of externalities. Usually these models display multiple equilibria. We provide an example of how the existence of some economic institutions and government policies can be explained as mechanisms for internalizing externalities and selecting the best equilibrium in these settings. The example we analyze is that of nominal wage and debt contracts. Nominal contracts can …
Endogenous Government Spending and Ricardian Equivalence
Journal Article Endogenous Government Spending and Ricardian Equivalence Get access Henning Bohn Henning Bohn The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 102, Issue 412, 1 May 1992, Pages 588–597, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234295 Published: 01 May 1992
Endogenous Government Spending and Ricardian Equivalence
Journal Article Endogenous Government Spending and Ricardian Equivalence Get access Henning Bohn Henning Bohn The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 102, Issue 412, 1 May 1992, Pages 588–597, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234295 Published: 01 May 1992
Endogenous Government Spending and Ricardian Equivalence
Journal Article Endogenous Government Spending and Ricardian Equivalence Get access Henning Bohn Henning Bohn The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 102, Issue 412, 1 May 1992, Pages 588–597, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234295 Published: 01 May 1992
Coordination Failure, Multiple Equilibria and Economic Institutions
Models of coordination failure have equilibria that are not first-best because of externalities. Usually these models display multiple equilibria. We provide an example of how the existence of some economic institutions and government policies can be explained as mechanisms for internalizing externalities and selecting the best equilibrium in these settings. The example we analyze is that of nominal wage and debt contracts. Nominal contracts can …
The Behavior of U. S. Public Debt and Deficits
How do governments react to the accumulation of debt? Do they take corrective measures, or do they let the debt grow? Whereas standard time series tests cannot reject a unit root in the U. S. debt-GDP ratio, this paper provides evidence of corrective action: the U. S. primary surplus is an increasing function of the debt-GDP ratio. The debt-GDP ratio displays mean-reversion if one controls for war-time spending and for cyclical fluctuations. The …
Ownership Risk, Investment, and the Use of Natural Resources
The effect of insecure ownership on ordinary investment and natural resource use is examined. Insecure ownership is postulated to depend on the type of government regime in power and the prevalence of political violence or instability. The political determinants of economywide investment are estimated from cross-country data, and the results are used to form an index of ownership security. When introduced into empirical models of natural resource…
The Economic Consequences of Rising U.S. Government Debt: Privileges at Risk
The rapidly growing federal government debt has become a concern for policy makers and the public. Yet the U.S. government has seemingly unbounded access to credit at low interest rates. Historically, Treasury yields have been below the growth rate of the economy. The paper examines the ramifications of debt financing at low interest rates. Given the short maturity of U.S. public debt — over $ 2.5 trillion maturing within a year — investor expect…
Economics (5 works) · Debt (3 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (2 works) · Government (linguistics) (2 works) · Macroeconomics (2 works) · Monetary Policy and Economic Impact (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (1 works)