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Coordination Failure, Multiple Equilibria and Economic Institutions

Bibliographic Data

ID9726313
AuthorsHenning Bohn, Gary Gorton (0000-0002-5317-3752), Gary B Gorton
Year1993
Volume60
Issue239
Pages257
Publication date1993-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomica (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2554851
OpenAlexW2029765120
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited8

Models of coordination failure have equilibria that are not first-best because of externalities. Usually these models display multiple equilibria. We provide an example of how the existence of some economic institutions and government policies can be explained as mechanisms for internalizing externalities and selecting the best equilibrium in these settings. The example we analyze is that of nominal wage and debt contracts. Nominal contracts can improve on the underinvestment equilibrium by implementing Pareto-improving transfers between agents. If there are multiple underinvestment equilibria, then monetary policy can have real effects because the monetary authority can choose a money supply rule to coordinate beliefs and, thereby, select the best equilibrium. Copyright 1993 by The London School of Economics and Political Science

Coordination failure · Coordination game · Debt · Economics · Equilibrium selection · Externality · Game theory · Macroeconomics · Microeconomics · Multi-objective optimization · Pareto efficiency · Pareto optimal · Pareto principle · Repeated game · Wage · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Policy

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Unique citing works1
Citations per year0,13
Citation span2018 - 2018 (1)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 1

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