Susana Peralta
Biographic Data
| ID | 5730293 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Susana Peralta |
| GIVEN NAMES | Susana |
| FAMILY NAME | Peralta |
| SIGNATURE | PERALTA S |
| AFFILIATIONS | CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 47 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The proximity-concentration trade-off with profit shifting
Coordination of capital taxation among asymmetric countries
Should countries control international profit shifting
Factor endowments and welfare levels in an asymmetric tax competition game
Economic Theories of Voter Turnout
The rationality of voting is the Achilles' heel of rational choice theory in political science. (Aldrich, 1997) In modern democracies thousands of citizens are eligible to vote in each election. An individual vote cast in such an election will conceivably have a negligible effect on its outcome. This leads to three interesting paradoxes: (i)The voting paradox Why would the rational individual bother to spend time and ;resources to become well inf…
Economic Theories of Voter Turnout
The rationality of voting is the Achilles' heel of rational choice theory in political science. (Aldrich, 1997) In modern democracies thousands of citizens are eligible to vote in each election. An individual vote cast in such an election will conceivably have a negligible effect on its outcome. This leads to three interesting paradoxes: (i)The voting paradox Why would the rational individual bother to spend time and ;resources to become well inf…
Factor endowments and welfare levels in an asymmetric tax competition game
Economic Theories of Voter Turnout
The rationality of voting is the Achilles' heel of rational choice theory in political science. (Aldrich, 1997) In modern democracies thousands of citizens are eligible to vote in each election. An individual vote cast in such an election will conceivably have a negligible effect on its outcome. This leads to three interesting paradoxes: (i)The voting paradox Why would the rational individual bother to spend time and ;resources to become well inf…
Should countries control international profit shifting
Factor endowments and welfare levels in an asymmetric tax competition game
Coordination of capital taxation among asymmetric countries
The proximity-concentration trade-off with profit shifting
Economics (5 works) · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance (4 works) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (4 works) · Monetary economics (4 works) · International economics (3 works) · Market economy (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Tax competition (3 works) · Tax reform (3 works) · Corporate Tax (2 works)