Economic Theories of Voter Turnout
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9704828 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Amrita Dhillon (0000-0003-4659-3617, University of Warwick), Samantha Peralta (0000-0002-3516-2339, UCLouvain), Susana Peralta (CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 112 |
| Issue | 480 |
| Pages | F332-F352 |
| Publication date | 2002-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1468-0297.00049 |
| OpenAlex | W1972030646 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 52 |
| References cited | 21 |
The rationality of voting is the Achilles' heel of rational choice theory in political science. (Aldrich, 1997) In modern democracies thousands of citizens are eligible to vote in each election. An individual vote cast in such an election will conceivably have a negligible effect on its outcome. This leads to three interesting paradoxes: (i)The voting paradox Why would the rational individual bother to spend time and ;resources to become well informed, go to the polls on the election day and maybe even wait in a queue? Why would a rational voter vote? (Downs, 1957) (ii)The paradox of indeterminacy If they vote why do they care who they vote for? (Kirchgassner, 1992; Kirchgassner and Pommerehne, 1993) (iii)The paradox of ignorance To the extent that information is costly, the rational voter must be ignorant about relevant aspects of his decision making (Downs, 1957). The answer to this last question has serious implications. If the only alternative one is left with is to label the voter as an irrational individual, then how can democracy and its institutions be defended and studied on rational grounds? Moreover, what will be the normative properties of social equilibria stemming from voting institutions, if individuals have a basic incentive to abstain, and the ones who vote are not rational? This would imply a fundamental flaw in the voting system, if indeed the models capture reality
Bullet voting · Disapproval voting · Economics · Law and economics · Normative · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Rational choice theory (criminology · Rational expectations · Rationality · Voting · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
Civic Capital and Development
Ties
Divided we fall? The effect of manufacturing decline on the social capital of US communities
Social Networks
Is Information Power? Using Mobile Phones and Free Newspapers during an Election in Mozambique
When are politicians incentivized to vote? Evidence from individual-level panel data (2015–2023)
Can Raising Instructional Time Crowd Out Student Pro-Social Behaviour? Evidence from Germany
Conflicted voters
Rational’ Theories of Voter Turnout
Explaining voter turnout
Large-Scale Evidence for the Effectiveness of Partisan Gotv Robo Calls
The more the merrier? The effects of system-aggregated group size information on user's efficacy and intention to participate in collective actions
Risk aversion and strategic voting
Information, get-out-the-vote messages, and peer influence
Does a voter's decision to sit out an election depend upon where others stand
Other-regarding preferences, in-group bias and political participation
Referendum design, quorum rules and turnout
(De)Centralization and voter turnout
When do voters boycott elections with participation quorums
Length of compulsory education and voter turnout—evidence from a staged reform
Who are the expressive voters
The effect of a reduction in the opening hours of polling stations on turnout
Elemental tests of the traditional rational voting model
Tax limits and local elections
Imposing a turnout threshold in referendums
The impact of closeness on turnout
The impact of closeness on electoral participation exploiting the Italian double ballot system
Increasing Voter Participation by Altering the Costs and Stakes of Voting
Location of Public Goods and the Calculus of Voting
From Violence to Voting
A note on electoral competition and turnout in run-off electoral systems
Free public transit and voter turnout
Alles eine Frage von Kosten und Nutzen? Eine Aggregatdatenanalyse der Abstimmungsbeteiligung in den deutschen Bundesländern zwischen 1946 und 2019
Unequal We Fight
How to Increase Turnout in Low-Salience Elections
Voter turnout and selective abstention in concurrent votes
The Passive-Aggressive Voter
Does the number of candidates increase turnout? Causal evidence from two-round elections
Upturning the turnout voting upside down
A Deeper Look at the Proportionality—Turnout Nexus
Nota
Beliefs and Voting Decisions
Sowing the Seeds
Expressive Political Behaviour
Institutional Openness and the Use of Referendums and Popular Initiatives
Puzzling evidence on voter turnout
Using prediction market data for measuring the expected closeness in electoral research
Voter turnout in small referendums
Term limits and voter turnout
Voting and Peer Effects
Local candidates and voter mobilization
What Motivates People to Vote? The Role of Selfishness, Duty, and Social Motives When Voting
Follow the Leader
An economic theory of democracy
When is it rational to vote?
Toward a Mathematics of Politics, by Gordon Tullock
A strategic calculus of voting
Abstention in two-candidate and three-candidate elections when voters use mixed strategies
Evolutionary dynamics in the voting game
The pure theory of large two-candidate elections
Low-cost decisions as a challenge to public choice
The Voting Decision
Economic voting and information
Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences
Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty
On the Apparent Paradox of Participation
| Unique citing works | 52 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,26 |
| Citation span | 2003 - 2026 (24) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 52 |