Bibhas Saha
Biographic Data
| ID | 5731585 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Bibhas Saha |
| GIVEN NAMES | Bibhas |
| FAMILY NAME | Saha |
| SIGNATURE | SAHA B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Durham University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0091-7455 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1995 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Caste and Credit
This article examines how caste shapes access to credit in India’s formal and informal lending markets. Using nationally representative data from the India Human Development Survey (2011–2012), we analyse loan application rates and loan amounts and compare outcomes between General Castes (GC) and three lower-caste groups: Other Backward Castes (OBC), Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST). We find that GC households are more likely to ap…
Electoral politics over automation in a dual economy
Bilateral Delegation, Wage Bargaining, and Innovation
A firm undertakes workers' productivity improving R&D before negotiating wage with the union, where negotiation can take place between their incentivised delegates. Under bilateral delegation profit, R&D and productivity-wage gap all increase, whilst the union's utility decreases, along with the union's bargaining power. However, to secure wage gains from productivity improvements via greater R&D and to ensure Pareto improvement in payoffs, the u…
Prejudice, bias and identity neutral policy
Enhancing Excellence
Social motivation can promote efficiency of public service delivery though its role in providing schooling is little understood. We provide both theoretical and empirical insights as to why not-for-profit private schools could enhance excellence in schooling, using Nepal as a case study. Results suggest that socially motivated trust schools outperform all other types of schools irrespective of whether we consider standardised test scores, absolut…
Credit where credit's due
Corrupt Bookmaking in a Fixed Odds Illegal Betting Market
Illegal betting in a two‐team sports contest is studied with player sabotage instigated by a monopolist bookmaker. Whereas punters hold beliefs about the teams’ winning chances correlated with Nature’s draw, the bookmaker’s information is noise‐free. Enforcement investigates with a higher probability, the greater the upset. In such an environment, if punters do not suspect match‐fixing, the favourite is bribed, thus creating upsets and intensifyi…
Entry Threats and Inefficiency in ‘Efficient Bargaining’
We study limit pricing in a model of entry with asymmetric information, where the incumbent firm's wage is endogenously determined through ‘efficient bargaining’ with its union. In the presence of entry threat, the incumbent firm‐union pair may face a conflict between rent sharing and transmitting its cost information. When the wage is not observable to outsiders and employment is the only signalling instrument, over‐employment features in all en…
Labour Institutions in China and India
This essay makes a comparative assessment of labour institutions of China and India. China's drastic labour reforms were to some extent necessary for the creation of a free labour market, which then allowed unfettered industrial growth and rapid employment, although they also led to some adverse effects on income distribution and industrial relations. In contrast, India's inability and reluctance to reform its rigid labour laws might have signifi…
Red tape, incentive bribe and the provision of subsidy
Side Choice and Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
This paper analyzes Nash equilibria of a sealed offer bargaining game where agents first choose their optimal trading sides before they begin bargaining. In a full-participation Nash equilibrium, the probability of any trader reaching an agreement at the bargaining stage will be higher than that obtained in bargaining models with exogenously fixed sides. However, owing to the additional uncertainty of finding a trading partner, the probability of…
Side Choice and Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
This paper analyzes Nash equilibria of a sealed offer bargaining game where agents first choose their optimal trading sides before they begin bargaining. In a full-participation Nash equilibrium, the probability of any trader reaching an agreement at the bargaining stage will be higher than that obtained in bargaining models with exogenously fixed sides. However, owing to the additional uncertainty of finding a trading partner, the probability of…
Red tape, incentive bribe and the provision of subsidy
Labour Institutions in China and India
This essay makes a comparative assessment of labour institutions of China and India. China's drastic labour reforms were to some extent necessary for the creation of a free labour market, which then allowed unfettered industrial growth and rapid employment, although they also led to some adverse effects on income distribution and industrial relations. In contrast, India's inability and reluctance to reform its rigid labour laws might have signifi…
Entry Threats and Inefficiency in ‘Efficient Bargaining’
We study limit pricing in a model of entry with asymmetric information, where the incumbent firm's wage is endogenously determined through ‘efficient bargaining’ with its union. In the presence of entry threat, the incumbent firm‐union pair may face a conflict between rent sharing and transmitting its cost information. When the wage is not observable to outsiders and employment is the only signalling instrument, over‐employment features in all en…
Corrupt Bookmaking in a Fixed Odds Illegal Betting Market
Illegal betting in a two‐team sports contest is studied with player sabotage instigated by a monopolist bookmaker. Whereas punters hold beliefs about the teams’ winning chances correlated with Nature’s draw, the bookmaker’s information is noise‐free. Enforcement investigates with a higher probability, the greater the upset. In such an environment, if punters do not suspect match‐fixing, the favourite is bribed, thus creating upsets and intensifyi…
Enhancing Excellence
Social motivation can promote efficiency of public service delivery though its role in providing schooling is little understood. We provide both theoretical and empirical insights as to why not-for-profit private schools could enhance excellence in schooling, using Nepal as a case study. Results suggest that socially motivated trust schools outperform all other types of schools irrespective of whether we consider standardised test scores, absolut…
Credit where credit's due
Prejudice, bias and identity neutral policy
Bilateral Delegation, Wage Bargaining, and Innovation
A firm undertakes workers' productivity improving R&D before negotiating wage with the union, where negotiation can take place between their incentivised delegates. Under bilateral delegation profit, R&D and productivity-wage gap all increase, whilst the union's utility decreases, along with the union's bargaining power. However, to secure wage gains from productivity improvements via greater R&D and to ensure Pareto improvement in payoffs, the u…
Electoral politics over automation in a dual economy
Caste and Credit
This article examines how caste shapes access to credit in India’s formal and informal lending markets. Using nationally representative data from the India Human Development Survey (2011–2012), we analyse loan application rates and loan amounts and compare outcomes between General Castes (GC) and three lower-caste groups: Other Backward Castes (OBC), Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST). We find that GC households are more likely to ap…
Economics (8 works) · Business (5 works) · Political science (4 works) · Labour economics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Bargaining power (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing (2 works) · Indian Economic and Social Development (2 works)