Ian Gregory‐Smith
Biographic Data
| ID | 5731976 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ian Gregory‐Smith |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ian |
| FAMILY NAME | Gregory‐Smith |
| SIGNATURE | SMITH I G |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Sheffield |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Discrimination in a Rank Order Contest
This paper examines discrimination in the NFL draft. The NFL is a favorable empirical setting to examine the role of skin color because franchise selectors are required to make rank-order judgements of players based on noisy signals of future productivity. Since wages are tightly related to the rank-order of the draft for the first four years of a player’s career, even if discrimination plays only a marginal role in selection, there could be a la…
Testing the Participation Constraint in the Executive Labour Market
This paper tests the participation constraint by examining the workings of the executive labour market in a panel of UK listed companies over a period of 14 years. Directors are found to move jobs regularly – both within companies and between companies. Consistent with agency theory, directors who are underpaid relative to their comparable peers are particularly likely to leave for higher paying jobs in other companies. Those who move between com…
CEO Pay and Voting Dissent Before and After the Crisis
‘Say on pay’ – that is empowering shareholders to vote on the remuneration arrangements of their firm's senior executives – has become an international policy response to the perceived explosion in rewards for top management. In this study, we examine the operation of say in pay in the UK, the country which pioneered its adoption, using the population of non-investment trust companies in the FTSE 350 over the period 2003–12. We find that executiv…
Fired or Retired? a Competing Risks Analysis of Chief Executive Turnover
We apply duration analysis to model the tenure and mode of exit of CEOs from FTSE 350 companies from 1996-2005, a decade in which corporate governance reforms have sought to increase the accountability of the CEO to shareholders and their representatives on the board. We find a greater likelihood of dismissal in the latter part of the period. However, we also find that the likelihood of forced departure sharply decreases from the fifth year of a …
Fired or Retired? a Competing Risks Analysis of Chief Executive Turnover
We apply duration analysis to model the tenure and mode of exit of CEOs from FTSE 350 companies from 1996-2005, a decade in which corporate governance reforms have sought to increase the accountability of the CEO to shareholders and their representatives on the board. We find a greater likelihood of dismissal in the latter part of the period. However, we also find that the likelihood of forced departure sharply decreases from the fifth year of a …
CEO Pay and Voting Dissent Before and After the Crisis
‘Say on pay’ – that is empowering shareholders to vote on the remuneration arrangements of their firm's senior executives – has become an international policy response to the perceived explosion in rewards for top management. In this study, we examine the operation of say in pay in the UK, the country which pioneered its adoption, using the population of non-investment trust companies in the FTSE 350 over the period 2003–12. We find that executiv…
Fired or Retired? a Competing Risks Analysis of Chief Executive Turnover
We apply duration analysis to model the tenure and mode of exit of CEOs from FTSE 350 companies from 1996-2005, a decade in which corporate governance reforms have sought to increase the accountability of the CEO to shareholders and their representatives on the board. We find a greater likelihood of dismissal in the latter part of the period. However, we also find that the likelihood of forced departure sharply decreases from the fifth year of a …
CEO Pay and Voting Dissent Before and After the Crisis
‘Say on pay’ – that is empowering shareholders to vote on the remuneration arrangements of their firm's senior executives – has become an international policy response to the perceived explosion in rewards for top management. In this study, we examine the operation of say in pay in the UK, the country which pioneered its adoption, using the population of non-investment trust companies in the FTSE 350 over the period 2003–12. We find that executiv…
Testing the Participation Constraint in the Executive Labour Market
This paper tests the participation constraint by examining the workings of the executive labour market in a panel of UK listed companies over a period of 14 years. Directors are found to move jobs regularly – both within companies and between companies. Consistent with agency theory, directors who are underpaid relative to their comparable peers are particularly likely to leave for higher paying jobs in other companies. Those who move between com…
Discrimination in a Rank Order Contest
This paper examines discrimination in the NFL draft. The NFL is a favorable empirical setting to examine the role of skin color because franchise selectors are required to make rank-order judgements of players based on noisy signals of future productivity. Since wages are tightly related to the rank-order of the draft for the first four years of a player’s career, even if discrimination plays only a marginal role in selection, there could be a la…
Business (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Corporate Finance and Governance (3 works) · Corporate governance (3 works) · Finance (3 works) · Finance (3 works) · Sociology (3 works)