CEO Pay and Voting Dissent Before and After the Crisis

Bibliographic Data

ID9950117
AuthorsIan Gregory‐Smith (University of Sheffield), Steve Thompson (0000-0002-1884-0409, University of Nottingham), Peter W Wright (University of Sheffield), Peter Wright (0000-0001-5424-2521, University of Sheffield)
Year2013
Volume124
Issue574
PagesF22-F39
Publication date2013-11-19
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ecoj.12108
OpenAlexW1970418342
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited18

‘Say on pay’ – that is empowering shareholders to vote on the remuneration arrangements of their firm's senior executives – has become an international policy response to the perceived explosion in rewards for top management. In this study, we examine the operation of say in pay in the UK, the country which pioneered its adoption, using the population of non-investment trust companies in the FTSE 350 over the period 2003–12. We find that executive remuneration and dissent on the remuneration committee report are positively correlated. However, the magnitude of this effect is small. We find that dissent plays a role in moderating future executive compensation levels, although this effect is restricted to levels of dissent above 10%, and primarily acting upon the higher quantiles of rewards

Business · Compensation (psychology · Corporate governance · Demographic economics · Dissent · Economics · Executive compensation · Incentive · Investment (military · Labour economics · Market economy · Political science · Politics · Population · Remuneration · Shareholder · Sociology · Voting · Accounting · Corporate Finance and Governance · Economic Policies and Impacts · Finance · Financial Markets and Investment Strategies · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology

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