Geir B Asheim
Biographic Data
| ID | 5732178 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Geir B Asheim |
| GIVEN NAMES | Geir B |
| FAMILY NAME | Asheim |
| SIGNATURE | ASHEIM G B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oslo |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0669-4632 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 14 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Rank-Discounting as a Resolution to a Dilemma in Population Ethics
When evaluating well‐being streams in an anonymous manner, one faces a dilemma between, on the one hand, assigning dictatorship to a single worst‐off individual and thus succumbing to a tyranny of non‐aggregation and, on the other hand, assigning dictatorship to (unboundedly) many better‐off individuals and thus succumbing to a tyranny of aggregation. This can be shown to correspond to a population‐ethical dilemma in the variable population setti…
What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion
The Repugnant Conclusion is an implication of some approaches to population ethics. It states, in Derek Parfit's original formulation, For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth living. (Parfit 1984: 388)
Escaping the repugnant conclusion: Rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population
We contribute to population ethics by proposing and axiomatizing rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarianism (RDCLU). Population ethics is needed for evaluation of policies, e.g., concerning climate change, where population size depends on the chosen policy. We show that critical-level generalized utilitarianism and (a version of) critical-level leximin are the limits of RDCLU for extreme values of the rank utility discount factor. …
Anomalies in green national accounting
Sustainability and discounted utilitarianism in models of economic growth
Justifying, Characterizing and Indicating Sustainability
Preference-based belief operators
The Malleability of Undiscounted Utilitarianism as a Criterion of Intergenerational Justice
Discounting future utilities is often justified by the ethically motivated objective of protecting earlier generations from the excessive saving that seems to be implied by undiscounted utilitarianism in productive economies. We question this justification of discounting by showing that undiscounted utilitarianism has sufficient malleability within important classes of technologies: any efficient and non‐decreasing allocation can be the unique op…
Deductive Reasoning in Extensive Games
We justify the application to extensive games of a model of deductive reasoning based on three key features: 'caution', 'full belief of opponent rationality', and 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs'. We apply the model to several examples, and show that it yields novel economic insights. The approach supports forward induction, without necessarily promoting backward induction
On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
Green National Accounting for Welfare and Sustainability: A Taxonomy of Assumptions and Results
This paper summarizes assumptions made and results obtained in parts of the literature on welfare and sustainability accounting. I consider five different assumptions that can be imposed independently of each other, producing 32 different combinations. This taxonomy is used to organize results in welfare and sustainability accounting. The analysis illustrates how stronger results require stronger assumptions and thereby impose harder informationa…
What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion
The Repugnant Conclusion is an implication of some approaches to population ethics. It states, in Derek Parfit's original formulation, For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth living. (Parfit 1984: 388)
Green National Accounting for Welfare and Sustainability: A Taxonomy of Assumptions and Results
This paper summarizes assumptions made and results obtained in parts of the literature on welfare and sustainability accounting. I consider five different assumptions that can be imposed independently of each other, producing 32 different combinations. This taxonomy is used to organize results in welfare and sustainability accounting. The analysis illustrates how stronger results require stronger assumptions and thereby impose harder informationa…
Sustainability and discounted utilitarianism in models of economic growth
Preference-based belief operators
On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
Green National Accounting for Welfare and Sustainability: A Taxonomy of Assumptions and Results
This paper summarizes assumptions made and results obtained in parts of the literature on welfare and sustainability accounting. I consider five different assumptions that can be imposed independently of each other, producing 32 different combinations. This taxonomy is used to organize results in welfare and sustainability accounting. The analysis illustrates how stronger results require stronger assumptions and thereby impose harder informationa…
The Malleability of Undiscounted Utilitarianism as a Criterion of Intergenerational Justice
Discounting future utilities is often justified by the ethically motivated objective of protecting earlier generations from the excessive saving that seems to be implied by undiscounted utilitarianism in productive economies. We question this justification of discounting by showing that undiscounted utilitarianism has sufficient malleability within important classes of technologies: any efficient and non‐decreasing allocation can be the unique op…
Deductive Reasoning in Extensive Games
We justify the application to extensive games of a model of deductive reasoning based on three key features: 'caution', 'full belief of opponent rationality', and 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs'. We apply the model to several examples, and show that it yields novel economic insights. The approach supports forward induction, without necessarily promoting backward induction
Preference-based belief operators
Justifying, Characterizing and Indicating Sustainability
Sustainability and discounted utilitarianism in models of economic growth
Anomalies in green national accounting
Escaping the repugnant conclusion: Rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population
We contribute to population ethics by proposing and axiomatizing rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarianism (RDCLU). Population ethics is needed for evaluation of policies, e.g., concerning climate change, where population size depends on the chosen policy. We show that critical-level generalized utilitarianism and (a version of) critical-level leximin are the limits of RDCLU for extreme values of the rank utility discount factor. …
What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion
The Repugnant Conclusion is an implication of some approaches to population ethics. It states, in Derek Parfit's original formulation, For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth living. (Parfit 1984: 388)
Rank-Discounting as a Resolution to a Dilemma in Population Ethics
When evaluating well‐being streams in an anonymous manner, one faces a dilemma between, on the one hand, assigning dictatorship to a single worst‐off individual and thus succumbing to a tyranny of non‐aggregation and, on the other hand, assigning dictatorship to (unboundedly) many better‐off individuals and thus succumbing to a tyranny of aggregation. This can be shown to correspond to a population‐ethical dilemma in the variable population setti…
Economics (9 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Mathematical economics (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Sustainable Development and Environmental Policy (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Climate Change Policy and Economics (3 works)