Deductive Reasoning in Extensive Games
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9708488 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Geir B Asheim (0000-0003-0669-4632, University of Oslo), Martin Dufwenberg (0000-0001-8014-2110, Stockholm University) |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 113 |
| Issue | 487 |
| Pages | 305-325 |
| Publication date | 2003-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1468-0297.00121 |
| OpenAlex | W2077449360 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 32 |
We justify the application to extensive games of a model of deductive reasoning based on three key features: 'caution', 'full belief of opponent rationality', and 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs'. We apply the model to several examples, and show that it yields novel economic insights. The approach supports forward induction, without necessarily promoting backward induction
Adversary · Backward induction · Bounded rationality · Computer security · Deductive reasoning · Economics · Epistemology · Game theory · Key (lock · Mathematical economics · Rationality · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Philosophy
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| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,25 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2022 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |