Yair Antler
Biographic Data
| ID | 5732231 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Yair Antler |
| GIVEN NAMES | Yair |
| FAMILY NAME | Antler |
| SIGNATURE | ANTLER Y |
| AFFILIATIONS | Tel Aviv University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0277-6078 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
An Experimental Analysis of the Prize–Probability Trade-Off in Stopping Problems
We experimentally examine how individuals commit to a cutoff stopping rule when facing a sequence of independent lotteries. We identify two main behavior patterns: (a) a small share of participants consistently choose stopping rules whose gain bound (i.e., the accumulated gain at which the sequence stops) is larger than the loss bound, and (b) a larger share of participants consistently choose rules whose loss bound is larger than the gain bound.…
Multilateral Contracting with Manipulation
We study multi-lateral risk sharing when the state of nature is unverifiable, so that contracts are conditioned on a state-dependent signal (e.g., net earnings in a financial report). A subset of the agents can manipulate the signal’s realisation at some cost and, as a result, Pareto-optimal reallocation of risk is precluded. The agents can write additional side contracts that can be used to incentivise one of the parties to manipulate the signal…
No One Likes To Be Second Choice
A decision-maker wishes to fill a vacancy with a fixed wage. Candidates who are more valuable to the decision maker are less likely to be available. The candidates suffer a disutility from filling the position when they are ranked low on the decision-maker's preference list. However, the decision-maker's preferences are his private information. Therefore, the candidates infer the decision-maker's preference list from information revealed by the n…
No One Likes To Be Second Choice
A decision-maker wishes to fill a vacancy with a fixed wage. Candidates who are more valuable to the decision maker are less likely to be available. The candidates suffer a disutility from filling the position when they are ranked low on the decision-maker's preference list. However, the decision-maker's preferences are his private information. Therefore, the candidates infer the decision-maker's preference list from information revealed by the n…
No One Likes To Be Second Choice
A decision-maker wishes to fill a vacancy with a fixed wage. Candidates who are more valuable to the decision maker are less likely to be available. The candidates suffer a disutility from filling the position when they are ranked low on the decision-maker's preference list. However, the decision-maker's preferences are his private information. Therefore, the candidates infer the decision-maker's preference list from information revealed by the n…
Multilateral Contracting with Manipulation
We study multi-lateral risk sharing when the state of nature is unverifiable, so that contracts are conditioned on a state-dependent signal (e.g., net earnings in a financial report). A subset of the agents can manipulate the signal’s realisation at some cost and, as a result, Pareto-optimal reallocation of risk is precluded. The agents can write additional side contracts that can be used to incentivise one of the parties to manipulate the signal…
An Experimental Analysis of the Prize–Probability Trade-Off in Stopping Problems
We experimentally examine how individuals commit to a cutoff stopping rule when facing a sequence of independent lotteries. We identify two main behavior patterns: (a) a small share of participants consistently choose stopping rules whose gain bound (i.e., the accumulated gain at which the sequence stops) is larger than the loss bound, and (b) a larger share of participants consistently choose rules whose loss bound is larger than the gain bound.…
Computer Science (3 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Actuarial science (1 work) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 work) · Business (1 work) · Chemistry (1 work) · Commit (1 work) · Cutoff (1 work)