Multilateral Contracting with Manipulation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9708587 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Yair Antler (0000-0002-0277-6078, Tel Aviv University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 131 |
| Issue | 639 |
| Pages | 2693-2725 |
| Publication date | 2021-10-04 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/ej/ueab013 |
| OpenAlex | W3132925516 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 37 |
We study multi-lateral risk sharing when the state of nature is unverifiable, so that contracts are conditioned on a state-dependent signal (e.g., net earnings in a financial report). A subset of the agents can manipulate the signal’s realisation at some cost and, as a result, Pareto-optimal reallocation of risk is precluded. The agents can write additional side contracts that can be used to incentivise one of the parties to manipulate the signal. Using a novel stability notion that takes into account agents’ beliefs about contemporaneous deviations initiated by their counterparties, we explore the limits of risk sharing and risk bearing
Actuarial science · Business · Earnings · Economics · Microeconomics · Operations management · Pareto optimal · Pareto principle · Realisation · Set (abstract data type · SIGNAL (programming language · State (computer science · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Finance · Risk and Portfolio Optimization · Stochastic processes and financial applications
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks
Farsighted Coalitional Stability
Informal insurance in social networks
Common Agency and Coordination
Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions
Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets
Reforming Libor and Other Financial Market Benchmarks
| Highly cited | No |
|---|