George J Mailath
Biographic Data
| ID | 5732385 |
|---|---|
| NAME | George J Mailath |
| GIVEN NAMES | George J |
| FAMILY NAME | Mailath |
| SIGNATURE | MAILATH G J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Australian National University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 43 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1992 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Laws and authority
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
We analyse a model in which agents make investments and match into pairs to create a surplus. The agents can reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus. Mailath et al. (2013) showed that when investments are unobservable, equilibrium investments are generally inefficient. We work here with a more structured and tractable model to analyse investment inefficiencies. We provide conditions under which investment is inefficiently hig…
"Response to "Aristocratic Equilibria
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
We analyze an evolutionary model with a finite number of players and with noise or mutations.The expansion and contraction of strategies is linked-as usual-to their current relative success, but mutations-which perturb the system away from its deterministic evolution-are present as well.Mutations can occur in every period, so the focus is on the implications of ongoing mutations, not a one-shot mutation.The effect of these mutations is to drastic…
Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth
The authors argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets. They interpret an agent's status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector. The existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in, for example, the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status. Moreover, it can naturally yield multiple equilibria. It is …
Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth
The authors argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets. They interpret an agent's status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector. The existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in, for example, the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status. Moreover, it can naturally yield multiple equilibria. It is …
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
We analyse a model in which agents make investments and match into pairs to create a surplus. The agents can reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus. Mailath et al. (2013) showed that when investments are unobservable, equilibrium investments are generally inefficient. We work here with a more structured and tractable model to analyse investment inefficiencies. We provide conditions under which investment is inefficiently hig…
"Response to "Aristocratic Equilibria
Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth
The authors argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets. They interpret an agent's status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector. The existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in, for example, the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status. Moreover, it can naturally yield multiple equilibria. It is …
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
We analyze an evolutionary model with a finite number of players and with noise or mutations.The expansion and contraction of strategies is linked-as usual-to their current relative success, but mutations-which perturb the system away from its deterministic evolution-are present as well.Mutations can occur in every period, so the focus is on the implications of ongoing mutations, not a one-shot mutation.The effect of these mutations is to drastic…
"Response to "Aristocratic Equilibria
Laws and authority
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
We analyse a model in which agents make investments and match into pairs to create a surplus. The agents can reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus. Mailath et al. (2013) showed that when investments are unobservable, equilibrium investments are generally inefficient. We work here with a more structured and tractable model to analyse investment inefficiencies. We provide conditions under which investment is inefficiently hig…
Economic theories and models (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Sociology (2 works) · Affect (linguistics) (1 works) · Art history (1 works)