Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9708924 |
|---|---|
| Authors | George J Mailath (University of Pennsylvania), Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania), Larry Samuelson (0000-0002-2702-2555, Yale University) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 127 |
| Issue | 604 |
| Pages | 2041-2065 |
| Publication date | 2017-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecoj.12400 |
| OpenAlex | W3125641830 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 21 |
We analyse a model in which agents make investments and match into pairs to create a surplus. The agents can reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus. Mailath et al. (2013) showed that when investments are unobservable, equilibrium investments are generally inefficient. We work here with a more structured and tractable model to analyse investment inefficiencies. We provide conditions under which investment is inefficiently high or low and when changes in the pretransfer \nownership claims on the surplus will be Pareto improving, and examine how the degree of heterogeneity on either side of the market affects investment efficiency
Econometrics · Economic surplus · Economics · Investment (military · Market economy · Matching (statistics · Microeconomics · Pareto efficiency · Pareto principle · Unobservable · Welfare · Work (physics · Auction Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Voting Systems
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,33 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2023 (4) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |