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Larry Samuelson

Biographic Data

ID326819
NAMELarry Samuelson
GIVEN NAMESLarry
FAMILY NAMESamuelson
SIGNATURESAMUELSON L
AFFILIATIONSPennsylvania State University
ORCID0000-0002-2702-2555
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS30
TOTAL CITATIONS58
AUTHOR COUNT30
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1981
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2023
H-INDEX5
  • The analogical foundations of cooperation

    Open Access•Philippe Jehiel, Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Theory•2023

    We offer an approach to cooperation in repeated games of private monitoring in which players construct models of their opponents' behavior by observing the frequencies of play in a record of past plays of the game in which actions but not signals are recorded. Players construct models of their opponent's behavior by grouping the histories in the record into a relatively small number of analogy classes for which they estimate probabilities of coop…

  • Economic Theory: Economics, Methods and Methodology

    Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite et al.•ARTICLE•Revue économique•2023•References: 7

    La théorie économique comprend trois types d’approche. L’une examine les phénomènes économiques, l’autre développe des outils d’analyse, et la derniére étudie l’effort scientifique en économie en général et en théorie économique en particulier. Nous appelons la première approche « l’économie », la seconde, « le développement de méthodes économiques » et la troisième, « la méthodologie de l’économie ». Le même résultat mathématique peut souvent ét…

  • No-betting Pareto under ambiguity

    Open Access•Itzhak Gilboa, Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•Theory and Decision•2022

  • States and Contingencies: How to Understand Savage without Anyone Being Hanged

    Itzhak Gilboa, Stefania Minardi et al.•ARTICLE•Revue économique•2020•Cited by: 1•References: 4

    La puissance des modèles de décision dans l’incertain repose en grande partie sur la spécification des états afin de résoudre toute l’incertitude. Cependant, cette spécification peut miner l’observabilité présumée des préférences sur laquelle se fondent les théories axiomatiques de la décision. Pour résoudre ce problème, nous introduisons la notion de contingence. Si les contingences ne décrivent pas nécessairement de manière exhaustive toutes le…

  • Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

    Open Access•George J Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2017•Cited by: 3•References: 19

    We analyse a model in which agents make investments and match into pairs to create a surplus. The agents can reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus. Mailath et al. (2013) showed that when investments are unobservable, equilibrium investments are generally inefficient. We work here with a more structured and tractable model to analyse investment inefficiencies. We provide conditions under which investment is inefficiently hig…

  • Game Theory in Economics and Beyond

    Open Access•Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2016•Cited by: 4•References: 6

    Within economics, game theory occupied a rather isolated niche in the 1960s and 1970s. It was pursued by people who were known specifically as game theorists and who did almost nothing but game theory, while other economists had little idea what game theory was. Game theory is now a standard tool in economics. Contributions to game theory are made by economists across the spectrum of fields and interests, and economists regularly combine work in …

  • Economic Models as Analogies

    Open Access•Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2014•Cited by: 6•References: 31

    People often wonder why economists analyze models whose as- sumptions are known to be false, while economists feel that they learn a great deal from such exercises. We suggest that part of the knowledge generated by academic economists is case-based rather than rule-based. That is, instead of oering general rules or theories that should be contrasted with data, economists often analyze models that are \theoretical cases", which help understand ec…

  • Reputation with Analogical Reasoning

    Philippe Jehiel, Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•2012

    We consider a repeated interaction between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run players, in which the long-run player may either be rational or may be a mechanical type who plays the same (possibly mixed) action in every stage game. We depart from the classical model in assuming that the short-run players make inferences by analogical reasoning, meaning that they correctly identify the average strategy of each type of long-run player, bu…

  • Managing Strategic Buyers

    Johannes Hörner, Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2011•References: 2

    We consider the problem of a monopolist who must sell her inventory before some deadline, facing buyers with independent private values. The seller faces a basic trade-off between imperfect price discrimination and maintaining an effective reserve price. When there is only one unit and only a few buyers, the seller essentially posts unacceptable prices up to the very end, at which point prices collapse in a series of jumps to a "reserve price" ex…

  • Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation against an Unknown Attacker

    Open Access•Vicki M Bier, VICKI BIER et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Public Economic Theory•2007

    We study a strategic model in which a defender must allocate defensive resources to a collection of locations and an attacker must choose a location to attack. In equilibrium, the defender sometimes optimally leaves a location undefended and sometimes prefers a higher vulnerability at a particular location even if a lower risk could be achieved at zero cost. The defender prefers to allocate resources in a centralized (rather than decentralized) m…

  • Evolution and Game Theory

    Open Access•Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2002•Cited by: 10•References: 26

    Research in noncooperative game theory has focused attention on two questions: Should we expect equilibrium play? If so, which of the multiple equilibria that arise in many games should we expect? This paper summarizes recent approaches to these questions that have been based on evolutionary models

  • Cooperation, Mimesis, and Local Interaction

    Open Access•Ilan Eshel, Dorothea K Herreiner et al.•ARTICLE•Sociological Methods & Research•2000•Cited by: 2•References: 7

    In a population with a local interaction structure, where individuals interact with their neighbors and learning is by way of imitating a successful neighbor, cooperation is shown to be a stable strategy that cannot easily be eliminated from the population

  • Hard Bargains and Lost Opportunities

    Open Access•Ken Binmore, Chris Proulx et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1998•Cited by: 4•References: 1

    A long tradition in economics assumes that any potential gains from trade will be exploited. This emphasis on efficiency clashes with the possibility that hard bargaining over the division of the surplus may cause some potential deals to be lost. We examine an Outside Option Game designed to study the tension between maximising the size of the surplus and bargaining over the division of this surplus among those who contributed to its creation. An…

  • Game and Economic Theory: Contributions in Honor of Robert J. Aumann

    Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1997

    Journal Article Game and Economic Theory: Contributions in Honor of Robert J. Aumann. Get access Game and Economic Theory: Contributions in Honor of Robert J. Aumann. Edited by Sergiu Hart and Abraham Neyman. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995. Pp. vi + 463. US$49.50 hardback. ISBN o 472 10673 2.) Larry Samuelson Larry Samuelson University of Wisconsin, Madison Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar T…

  • Essays on the Foundations of Game Theory

    Larry Samuelson, Kenneth G Binmore et al.•ARTICLE•Economica•1992

    The aims and scope of game theory Nash equilibrium information common knowledge and game theory modelling rational payers modeling rational players

  • The Growth and Failure of U. S. Manufacturing Plants

    Timothy Dunne, Mark J Roberts et al.•ARTICLE•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•1989

    This paper examines the patterns of postentry employment growth and failure for over 200,000 plants that entered the U. S. manufacturing sector in the 1967–1977 period. The postentry patterns of growth and failure vary significantly with observable employer characteristics. Plant failure rates decline with size and age as do the growth rates of nonfailing plants. The expected growth rate of a plant, which depends on the net effect of these two fo…

  • Strategic Behaviour and the Rules for International Taxation of Capital

    Eric W Bond, Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1989•Cited by: 5

    Journal Article Strategic Behaviour and the Rules for International Taxation of Capital Get access Eric W. Bond, Eric W. Bond Pennsylvania State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Larry Samuelson Larry Samuelson Pennsylvania State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 99, Issue 398, 1 December 1989, Pages 1099–1111, https://…

  • Information and Equilibrium with Inside Traders

    Leonard J Mirman, Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1989

    Journal Article Information and Equilibrium with Inside Traders Get access Leonard J. Mirman, Leonard J. Mirman University of Virginia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Larry Samuelson Larry Samuelson Pennsylvania State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 99, Issue 395, 1 April 1989, Pages 152–167, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234077 Pu…

  • Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in U.S. Manufacturing Industries

    Open Access•Timothy Dunne, Mark J Roberts et al.•ARTICLE•The RAND Journal of Economics•1988

    This article summarizes the patterns of firm entry, growth, and exit in the four-digit U.S. manufacturing industries over the period 1963-1982. Entrants are disaggregated into new firms, existing firms that diversify into an industry by opening new production facilities, and existing firms that enter by altering the mix of outputs they produce in their existing plants. We examine the relative importance of different types of entrants, the persist…

  • Inflation, indexing and economic development

    Open Access•Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•World Development•1987•References: 3

  • On the restrictiveness of monotonic scalable choice in probabilistic choice models

    Open Access•Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•1987•References: 23

  • A test of the revealed-preference phenomenon in congressional elections

    Open Access•Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1987•Cited by: 3•References: 47

  • Durable Goods, Market Structure and the Incentives to Innovate

    Eric W Bond, Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•Economica•1987

    A commonly-cited finding in the innovation literature is that a monopoly tends to innovate too little. This paper demonstrates that a monopoly may devote more resources to innovation than is socially optimal if it produces a durable good. This possibility occurs because durability creates new innovation incentives. Once an initial stock of a durable good has been produced, the monopoly faces a residual demand for the good. Innovation may allow th…

  • The Multinational Firm and Exhaustible Resources

    Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•Economica•1986

    A multinational firm trading in exhaustible resources is examined. The exhaustibility of the transferred good requires the generalization of some existing concepts and introduces some new results. The optimal extraction strategy is examined, and comparative static implications of government policies are established. The performance of the multinational is compared with the outcomes that arise in the absence of a multinational, under varying assum…

  • Expository Marxism and Comparative Economic Dynamics

    Larry Samuelson, Murray Wolfson•ARTICLE•History of Political Economy•1986•Cited by: 5•References: 9

    Research Article| March 01 1986 Expository Marxism and Comparative Economic Dynamics Larry Samuelson; Larry Samuelson Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Murray Wolfson Murray Wolfson 1 Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1986) 18 (1): 65–85. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-18-1-65 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Larry Samuelson, …

Next
  • Evolution and Game Theory

    Open Access•Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2002•Cited by: 10•References: 26

    Research in noncooperative game theory has focused attention on two questions: Should we expect equilibrium play? If so, which of the multiple equilibria that arise in many games should we expect? This paper summarizes recent approaches to these questions that have been based on evolutionary models

  • Electoral equilibria with restricted strategies

    Open Access•Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1984•Cited by: 8•References: 31

  • Economic Models as Analogies

    Open Access•Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2014•Cited by: 6•References: 31

    People often wonder why economists analyze models whose as- sumptions are known to be false, while economists feel that they learn a great deal from such exercises. We suggest that part of the knowledge generated by academic economists is case-based rather than rule-based. That is, instead of oering general rules or theories that should be contrasted with data, economists often analyze models that are \theoretical cases", which help understand ec…

  • Strategic Behaviour and the Rules for International Taxation of Capital

    Eric W Bond, Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1989•Cited by: 5

    Journal Article Strategic Behaviour and the Rules for International Taxation of Capital Get access Eric W. Bond, Eric W. Bond Pennsylvania State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Larry Samuelson Larry Samuelson Pennsylvania State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 99, Issue 398, 1 December 1989, Pages 1099–1111, https://…

  • Expository Marxism and Comparative Economic Dynamics

    Larry Samuelson, Murray Wolfson•ARTICLE•History of Political Economy•1986•Cited by: 5•References: 9

    Research Article| March 01 1986 Expository Marxism and Comparative Economic Dynamics Larry Samuelson; Larry Samuelson Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Murray Wolfson Murray Wolfson 1 Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1986) 18 (1): 65–85. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-18-1-65 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Larry Samuelson, …

  • Game Theory in Economics and Beyond

    Open Access•Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2016•Cited by: 4•References: 6

    Within economics, game theory occupied a rather isolated niche in the 1960s and 1970s. It was pursued by people who were known specifically as game theorists and who did almost nothing but game theory, while other economists had little idea what game theory was. Game theory is now a standard tool in economics. Contributions to game theory are made by economists across the spectrum of fields and interests, and economists regularly combine work in …

  • Hard Bargains and Lost Opportunities

    Open Access•Ken Binmore, Chris Proulx et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1998•Cited by: 4•References: 1

    A long tradition in economics assumes that any potential gains from trade will be exploited. This emphasis on efficiency clashes with the possibility that hard bargaining over the division of the surplus may cause some potential deals to be lost. We examine an Outside Option Game designed to study the tension between maximising the size of the surplus and bargaining over the division of this surplus among those who contributed to its creation. An…

  • Toward a service-oriented growth strategy

    Open Access•Werner Baer, Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•World Development•1981•Cited by: 4•References: 4

  • Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

    Open Access•George J Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2017•Cited by: 3•References: 19

    We analyse a model in which agents make investments and match into pairs to create a surplus. The agents can reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus. Mailath et al. (2013) showed that when investments are unobservable, equilibrium investments are generally inefficient. We work here with a more structured and tractable model to analyse investment inefficiencies. We provide conditions under which investment is inefficiently hig…

  • A test of the revealed-preference phenomenon in congressional elections

    Open Access•Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1987•Cited by: 3•References: 47

  • Cooperation, Mimesis, and Local Interaction

    Open Access•Ilan Eshel, Dorothea K Herreiner et al.•ARTICLE•Sociological Methods & Research•2000•Cited by: 2•References: 7

    In a population with a local interaction structure, where individuals interact with their neighbors and learning is by way of imitating a successful neighbor, cooperation is shown to be a stable strategy that cannot easily be eliminated from the population

  • On Wicksell's Missing Equation

    Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•History of Political Economy•1982•Cited by: 2•References: 4

    Research Article| September 01 1982 On Wicksell's Missing Equation Larry Samuelson Larry Samuelson Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1982) 14 (3): 301–307. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-14-3-301 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation Larry Samuelson; On Wicksell's Missing Equation. History of Political Economy 1 September 1982; 14 (…

  • States and Contingencies: How to Understand Savage without Anyone Being Hanged

    Itzhak Gilboa, Stefania Minardi et al.•ARTICLE•Revue économique•2020•Cited by: 1•References: 4

    La puissance des modèles de décision dans l’incertain repose en grande partie sur la spécification des états afin de résoudre toute l’incertitude. Cependant, cette spécification peut miner l’observabilité présumée des préférences sur laquelle se fondent les théories axiomatiques de la décision. Pour résoudre ce problème, nous introduisons la notion de contingence. Si les contingences ne décrivent pas nécessairement de manière exhaustive toutes le…

  • The Wicksell Effect in a Growing Economy

    Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•History of Political Economy•1982•Cited by: 1•References: 13

    Research Article| November 01 1982 The Wicksell Effect in a Growing Economy Larry Samuelson Larry Samuelson Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1982) 14 (4): 447–460. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-14-4-447 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation Larry Samuelson; The Wicksell Effect in a Growing Economy. History of Political Economy 1 N…

  • Toward a service-oriented growth strategy

    Open Access•Werner Baer, Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•World Development•1981•Cited by: 4•References: 4

  • On Wicksell's Missing Equation

    Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•History of Political Economy•1982•Cited by: 2•References: 4

    Research Article| September 01 1982 On Wicksell's Missing Equation Larry Samuelson Larry Samuelson Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1982) 14 (3): 301–307. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-14-3-301 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation Larry Samuelson; On Wicksell's Missing Equation. History of Political Economy 1 September 1982; 14 (…

  • The Wicksell Effect in a Growing Economy

    Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•History of Political Economy•1982•Cited by: 1•References: 13

    Research Article| November 01 1982 The Wicksell Effect in a Growing Economy Larry Samuelson Larry Samuelson Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1982) 14 (4): 447–460. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-14-4-447 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation Larry Samuelson; The Wicksell Effect in a Growing Economy. History of Political Economy 1 N…

  • Electoral equilibria with restricted strategies

    Open Access•Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1984•Cited by: 8•References: 31

  • Returns to Scale and Wicksell's Missing Equation: A Note

    Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•History of Political Economy•1984•References: 6

    Research Article| November 01 1984 Returns to Scale and Wicksell's Missing Equation: a Note Larry Samuelson Larry Samuelson Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1984) 16 (4): 577–582. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-16-4-577 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Larry Samuelson; Returns to Scale and Wicksell's Missing Equation: a Note.…

  • The Multinational Firm and Exhaustible Resources

    Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•Economica•1986

    A multinational firm trading in exhaustible resources is examined. The exhaustibility of the transferred good requires the generalization of some existing concepts and introduces some new results. The optimal extraction strategy is examined, and comparative static implications of government policies are established. The performance of the multinational is compared with the outcomes that arise in the absence of a multinational, under varying assum…

  • Expository Marxism and Comparative Economic Dynamics

    Larry Samuelson, Murray Wolfson•ARTICLE•History of Political Economy•1986•Cited by: 5•References: 9

    Research Article| March 01 1986 Expository Marxism and Comparative Economic Dynamics Larry Samuelson; Larry Samuelson Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Murray Wolfson Murray Wolfson 1 Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1986) 18 (1): 65–85. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-18-1-65 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Larry Samuelson, …

  • Inflation, indexing and economic development

    Open Access•Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•World Development•1987•References: 3

  • On the restrictiveness of monotonic scalable choice in probabilistic choice models

    Open Access•Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•1987•References: 23

  • A test of the revealed-preference phenomenon in congressional elections

    Open Access•Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1987•Cited by: 3•References: 47

  • Durable Goods, Market Structure and the Incentives to Innovate

    Eric W Bond, Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•Economica•1987

    A commonly-cited finding in the innovation literature is that a monopoly tends to innovate too little. This paper demonstrates that a monopoly may devote more resources to innovation than is socially optimal if it produces a durable good. This possibility occurs because durability creates new innovation incentives. Once an initial stock of a durable good has been produced, the monopoly faces a residual demand for the good. Innovation may allow th…

  • Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in U.S. Manufacturing Industries

    Open Access•Timothy Dunne, Mark J Roberts et al.•ARTICLE•The RAND Journal of Economics•1988

    This article summarizes the patterns of firm entry, growth, and exit in the four-digit U.S. manufacturing industries over the period 1963-1982. Entrants are disaggregated into new firms, existing firms that diversify into an industry by opening new production facilities, and existing firms that enter by altering the mix of outputs they produce in their existing plants. We examine the relative importance of different types of entrants, the persist…

  • The Growth and Failure of U. S. Manufacturing Plants

    Timothy Dunne, Mark J Roberts et al.•ARTICLE•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•1989

    This paper examines the patterns of postentry employment growth and failure for over 200,000 plants that entered the U. S. manufacturing sector in the 1967–1977 period. The postentry patterns of growth and failure vary significantly with observable employer characteristics. Plant failure rates decline with size and age as do the growth rates of nonfailing plants. The expected growth rate of a plant, which depends on the net effect of these two fo…

  • Strategic Behaviour and the Rules for International Taxation of Capital

    Eric W Bond, Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1989•Cited by: 5

    Journal Article Strategic Behaviour and the Rules for International Taxation of Capital Get access Eric W. Bond, Eric W. Bond Pennsylvania State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Larry Samuelson Larry Samuelson Pennsylvania State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 99, Issue 398, 1 December 1989, Pages 1099–1111, https://…

  • Information and Equilibrium with Inside Traders

    Leonard J Mirman, Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1989

    Journal Article Information and Equilibrium with Inside Traders Get access Leonard J. Mirman, Leonard J. Mirman University of Virginia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Larry Samuelson Larry Samuelson Pennsylvania State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 99, Issue 395, 1 April 1989, Pages 152–167, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234077 Pu…

  • Essays on the Foundations of Game Theory

    Larry Samuelson, Kenneth G Binmore et al.•ARTICLE•Economica•1992

    The aims and scope of game theory Nash equilibrium information common knowledge and game theory modelling rational payers modeling rational players

  • Game and Economic Theory: Contributions in Honor of Robert J. Aumann

    Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1997

    Journal Article Game and Economic Theory: Contributions in Honor of Robert J. Aumann. Get access Game and Economic Theory: Contributions in Honor of Robert J. Aumann. Edited by Sergiu Hart and Abraham Neyman. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995. Pp. vi + 463. US$49.50 hardback. ISBN o 472 10673 2.) Larry Samuelson Larry Samuelson University of Wisconsin, Madison Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar T…

  • Hard Bargains and Lost Opportunities

    Open Access•Ken Binmore, Chris Proulx et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1998•Cited by: 4•References: 1

    A long tradition in economics assumes that any potential gains from trade will be exploited. This emphasis on efficiency clashes with the possibility that hard bargaining over the division of the surplus may cause some potential deals to be lost. We examine an Outside Option Game designed to study the tension between maximising the size of the surplus and bargaining over the division of this surplus among those who contributed to its creation. An…

  • Cooperation, Mimesis, and Local Interaction

    Open Access•Ilan Eshel, Dorothea K Herreiner et al.•ARTICLE•Sociological Methods & Research•2000•Cited by: 2•References: 7

    In a population with a local interaction structure, where individuals interact with their neighbors and learning is by way of imitating a successful neighbor, cooperation is shown to be a stable strategy that cannot easily be eliminated from the population

  • Evolution and Game Theory

    Open Access•Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2002•Cited by: 10•References: 26

    Research in noncooperative game theory has focused attention on two questions: Should we expect equilibrium play? If so, which of the multiple equilibria that arise in many games should we expect? This paper summarizes recent approaches to these questions that have been based on evolutionary models

  • Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation against an Unknown Attacker

    Open Access•Vicki M Bier, VICKI BIER et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Public Economic Theory•2007

    We study a strategic model in which a defender must allocate defensive resources to a collection of locations and an attacker must choose a location to attack. In equilibrium, the defender sometimes optimally leaves a location undefended and sometimes prefers a higher vulnerability at a particular location even if a lower risk could be achieved at zero cost. The defender prefers to allocate resources in a centralized (rather than decentralized) m…

  • Managing Strategic Buyers

    Johannes Hörner, Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2011•References: 2

    We consider the problem of a monopolist who must sell her inventory before some deadline, facing buyers with independent private values. The seller faces a basic trade-off between imperfect price discrimination and maintaining an effective reserve price. When there is only one unit and only a few buyers, the seller essentially posts unacceptable prices up to the very end, at which point prices collapse in a series of jumps to a "reserve price" ex…

  • Reputation with Analogical Reasoning

    Philippe Jehiel, Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•2012

    We consider a repeated interaction between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run players, in which the long-run player may either be rational or may be a mechanical type who plays the same (possibly mixed) action in every stage game. We depart from the classical model in assuming that the short-run players make inferences by analogical reasoning, meaning that they correctly identify the average strategy of each type of long-run player, bu…

  • Economic Models as Analogies

    Open Access•Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2014•Cited by: 6•References: 31

    People often wonder why economists analyze models whose as- sumptions are known to be false, while economists feel that they learn a great deal from such exercises. We suggest that part of the knowledge generated by academic economists is case-based rather than rule-based. That is, instead of oering general rules or theories that should be contrasted with data, economists often analyze models that are \theoretical cases", which help understand ec…

  • Game Theory in Economics and Beyond

    Open Access•Larry Samuelson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2016•Cited by: 4•References: 6

    Within economics, game theory occupied a rather isolated niche in the 1960s and 1970s. It was pursued by people who were known specifically as game theorists and who did almost nothing but game theory, while other economists had little idea what game theory was. Game theory is now a standard tool in economics. Contributions to game theory are made by economists across the spectrum of fields and interests, and economists regularly combine work in …

Economics (24 works) · Computer Science (20 works) · Economic theories and models (12 works) · Mathematical economics (12 works) · Microeconomics (11 works) · Game Theory and Applications (8 works) · Political science (8 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (7 works) · Econometrics (7 works) · Business (6 works)

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