Hard Bargains and Lost Opportunities
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9717423 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ken Binmore (0000-0001-8442-7359, University College London), Chris Proulx (University of Michigan), Larry Samuelson (0000-0002-2702-2555, University of Wisconsin), Joe Swierzbinski (University College London) |
| Year | 1998 |
| Volume | 108 |
| Issue | 450 |
| Pages | 1279-1298 |
| Publication date | 1998-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1468-0297.00343 |
| OpenAlex | W1976902229 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 3 |
A long tradition in economics assumes that any potential gains from trade will be exploited. This emphasis on efficiency clashes with the possibility that hard bargaining over the division of the surplus may cause some potential deals to be lost. We examine an Outside Option Game designed to study the tension between maximising the size of the surplus and bargaining over the division of this surplus among those who contributed to its creation. An experimental study confirms that subjects often fail to achieve efficient outcomes. A theoretical model accounts for this behaviour in terms of an equilibrium achieved in an imperfect world
Division (mathematics · Economic surplus · Economics · General equilibrium theory · Imperfect · Market economy · Microeconomics · Neoclassical economics · Welfare · Auction Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,12 |
| Citation span | 2001 - 2026 (26) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |