Dennis W Carlton
Biographic Data
| ID | 5732887 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dennis W Carlton |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dennis W |
| FAMILY NAME | Carlton |
| SIGNATURE | CARLTON D W |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Chicago |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1977 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Upgrades, Switching Costs and the Leverage Theory of Tying
Journal Article Upgrades, Switching Costs and the Leverage Theory of Tying Get access Dennis W. Carlton, Dennis W. Carlton University of Chicago and NBER Cornell University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Michael Waldman Michael Waldman University of Chicago and NBER Cornell University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 122, Issue 561, 1 Ju…
Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized
Economics has had an enormous positive effect on the evolution of antitrust policy over the last 30 years or so. However, the evolving forces of technology and globalization, together with experience gained over time, suggest that further modernization is in order. This paper addresses a number of controversial antitrust doctrines that need fixing, or at least some modernizing. Specifically, I analyze market definition; the interaction of intelle…
Theory of Industrial Organization. Jean Tirole
The Location and Employment Choices of New Firms
Dennis W. Carlton, The Location and Employment Choices of New Firms: An Econometric Model with Discrete and Continuous Endogenous Variables, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Aug., 1983), pp. 440-449
The Regulation of Insider Trading
Imagine two firms, A and B, which are identical in all respects except that, in its charter, firm A prohibits the trading of its shares based on inside (nonpublic) information.The firm requires insiders (employees) to report their trades, which a special committee or an independent accounting firm then checks to ensure compliance with the charter provision.Firm B, by contrast, neither prohibits insider trading nor requires reporting.Insiders open…
Contracts, Price Rigidity, and Market Equilibrium
This paper presents a model of a market characterized by uncertainty and transaction costs. The uncertainty and transaction costs create incentives for firms to use both long- and short-term fixed-price contracts. The model sheds light on several puzzling empirical observations. I explain why long-term-contract prices can move by different magnitudes and even in different directions than short-term prices, why econometric price equations are like…
Selecting subsidy strategies for housing allowance programs
Contracts, Price Rigidity, and Market Equilibrium
This paper presents a model of a market characterized by uncertainty and transaction costs. The uncertainty and transaction costs create incentives for firms to use both long- and short-term fixed-price contracts. The model sheds light on several puzzling empirical observations. I explain why long-term-contract prices can move by different magnitudes and even in different directions than short-term prices, why econometric price equations are like…
Selecting subsidy strategies for housing allowance programs
The Regulation of Insider Trading
Imagine two firms, A and B, which are identical in all respects except that, in its charter, firm A prohibits the trading of its shares based on inside (nonpublic) information.The firm requires insiders (employees) to report their trades, which a special committee or an independent accounting firm then checks to ensure compliance with the charter provision.Firm B, by contrast, neither prohibits insider trading nor requires reporting.Insiders open…
Selecting subsidy strategies for housing allowance programs
Contracts, Price Rigidity, and Market Equilibrium
This paper presents a model of a market characterized by uncertainty and transaction costs. The uncertainty and transaction costs create incentives for firms to use both long- and short-term fixed-price contracts. The model sheds light on several puzzling empirical observations. I explain why long-term-contract prices can move by different magnitudes and even in different directions than short-term prices, why econometric price equations are like…
The Location and Employment Choices of New Firms
Dennis W. Carlton, The Location and Employment Choices of New Firms: An Econometric Model with Discrete and Continuous Endogenous Variables, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Aug., 1983), pp. 440-449
The Regulation of Insider Trading
Imagine two firms, A and B, which are identical in all respects except that, in its charter, firm A prohibits the trading of its shares based on inside (nonpublic) information.The firm requires insiders (employees) to report their trades, which a special committee or an independent accounting firm then checks to ensure compliance with the charter provision.Firm B, by contrast, neither prohibits insider trading nor requires reporting.Insiders open…
Theory of Industrial Organization. Jean Tirole
Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized
Economics has had an enormous positive effect on the evolution of antitrust policy over the last 30 years or so. However, the evolving forces of technology and globalization, together with experience gained over time, suggest that further modernization is in order. This paper addresses a number of controversial antitrust doctrines that need fixing, or at least some modernizing. Specifically, I analyze market definition; the interaction of intelle…
Upgrades, Switching Costs and the Leverage Theory of Tying
Journal Article Upgrades, Switching Costs and the Leverage Theory of Tying Get access Dennis W. Carlton, Dennis W. Carlton University of Chicago and NBER Cornell University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Michael Waldman Michael Waldman University of Chicago and NBER Cornell University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 122, Issue 561, 1 Ju…
Economics (6 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Digital Platforms and Economics (2 works) · Econometrics (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Housing Market and Economics (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works)